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Message-ID: <20140723222506.GA29033@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 00:25:06 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
hch@...radead.org, lczerner@...hat.com, tytso@....edu,
tyhicks@...onical.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] ext4: RFC: Encryption
Hi!
> This patchset proposes a method for encrypting in EXT4 data read and
> write paths. It's a proof-of-concept/prototype only right
> now. Outstanding issues:
>
> * While it seems to work well with complex tasks like a parallel
> kernel build, fsx is pretty good at reliably breaking it in its
> current form. I think it's trying to decrypt a page of all zeros
> when doing a mmap'd write after an falloc. I want to get feedback
> on the overall approach before I spend too much time bug-hunting.
>
> * It has not undergone a security audit/review. It isn't IND-CCA2
> secure, and that's the goal. We need a way to store (at least)
> page-granular metadata.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_indistinguishability#Indistinguishability_under_chosen_ciphertext_attack.2Fadaptive_chosen_ciphertext_attack_.28IND-CCA1.2C_IND-CCA2.29
So .. you are trying to say that if I offer Disney ability to decrypt
their chosen data, Disney may be able to prove I have their film
encrypted elsewhere on the disk?
Is it supposed to be IND-CPA secure? I.e. can Disney prove I have
their film on my disk if I don't help them? IND-CCA1?
Can I keep just a subtree (/home/pavel/.ssh) encrypted?
Hmm, I might actually want to try this.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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