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Message-ID: <CA+POJK27qZeLsPu+zLDU+GmpGiY715_M1hdVxPJap9SUmydt4Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 15:39:20 -0700
From: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, hch@...radead.org,
lczerner@...hat.com, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] ext4: RFC: Encryption
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 3:34 PM, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> wrote:
> On Thu 2014-07-24 00:25:06, Pavel Machek wrote:
>> Hi!
>> > This patchset proposes a method for encrypting in EXT4 data read and
>> > write paths. It's a proof-of-concept/prototype only right
>> > now. Outstanding issues:
>> >
>> > * While it seems to work well with complex tasks like a parallel
>> > kernel build, fsx is pretty good at reliably breaking it in its
>> > current form. I think it's trying to decrypt a page of all zeros
>> > when doing a mmap'd write after an falloc. I want to get feedback
>> > on the overall approach before I spend too much time bug-hunting.
>
>> Can I keep just a subtree (/home/pavel/.ssh) encrypted?
>
> Ok, as far as I can tell no, this is whole filesystem encryption for
> now. I guess encrypting based on some attribute is planned...?
Correct; that's TBD as part of the LSS discussion next month. You can see
it wouldn't be that far-fetched to add an xattr to the parent directory that
specifies the key sig to use. It's just that unexpected things can happen
with hard links.
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