Message-ID: <5c01fd8e-95e6-669c-9f9d-30ab5a7af9fd@nod.at>
Date:   Wed, 5 Oct 2016 20:44:09 +0200
From:   Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
To:     Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
        David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
Cc:     linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, jaegeuk@...nel.org,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Anand Jain <anand.jain@...cle.com>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypto: make XTS tweak initialization
 endian-independent

Michael,

On 05.10.2016 20:23, Michael Halcrow wrote:
>> Eric,
>>
>>> On 04.10.2016, at 18:38, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 04, 2016 at 10:46:54AM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote:
>>>>> Also, currently this code *is* only supposed to be used for XTS.
>>>>> There's a bug where a specially crafted filesystem can cause
>>>>> this code path to be entered with CTS, but I have a patch
>>>>> pending in the ext4 tree to fix that.
>>>>
>>>> David and I are currently working on UBIFS encryption and we have
>>>> to support other cipher modes than XTS. So, keeping fscrypto as
>>>> generic as possible would be nice. :-)
>>>>
>>>
>>> The problem was that the kernel supported reading a file whose
>>> contents was encrypted with CTS, which is only supposed to be used
>>> for filenames.  This was inconsistent with
>>> FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY which currently only allows XTS for
>>> contents and CTS for filenames.  So in other words I wanted to
>>> eliminate a strange scenario that was not intended to happen and
>>> was almost certainly never tested.
>>>
>>> Either way, new modes can still be added if there is a good reason
>>> to do so.  What new encryption modes are you thinking of adding,
>>> would they be for contents or for filenames, and are you thinking
>>> they would be offered by all filesystems (ext4 and f2fs too)?
>>
>> We currently have one case where our embedded platform is only able
>> to do AES-CBC in hardware, not AES-XTS. So switching to AES-CBC for
>> file contents would yield far better performance while still being
>> "secure enough".
> 
> Great to see more interest in file system encryption.  A few thoughts.
> 
> I'm concerned about the proliferation of storage encryption code in
> the kernel.  Of course, I'm perhaps the worst instigator.  However
> what's happening now is that we have several file systems that are
> proposing their own encryption, as well as several attempts at support
> for hardware encryption.
> 
> High-performance random access read/write block storage encryption
> with authentication is hard to get right.  The way I see it, the ideal
> solution would have these properties:
> 
>  * The actual cryptographic transform happens in as few places as
>    possible -- preferably one place in software, with a sensible
>    vendor-neutral API for defering to hardware.
> 
>  * All blocks in the file system, including both file contents and
>    file system metadata, are cryptographically protected.
> 
>  * Encryption is authenticated and has versioning support to enforce
>    consistency and defend against rollback.
> 
>  * File systems can select which keys protect which blocks.
> 
>  * Authentication of all storage chains back to Secure Boot.
> 
> To solve all of these simultaneously, it looks like we'll want to
> consider changes to the kernel block API:

Not all filesystems use the block layer, hint: UBIFS.

> From here, we can delegate to dm-crypt to perform the block
> transformation using the key in the bio.  Or we can defer to the block
> storage driver to provision the key into the hardware encryption
> element and tag requests to use that key.
> 
> This promises to get a big chunk of the file contents encryption logic
> out of the file system layer.
> 
> If the file system doesn't provide a bi_crypt_ctx, then dm-crypt can
> use the default key, which would be shared among all tenants of the
> system.  That shared key can potentially be further protected by the
> distro by leveraging a secure element like a TPM.

No dm-crypt available in MTD land.

> For user-specific file contents -- say, what's in the user's home
> directory -- then that can be protected with a key that's only made
> available after the user logs in (providing their credentials).  Other
> tenants on the same device who can get at the shared key might still
> get information like how many files other users have or what the
> directory structure is, but at least they can't read the contents of
> other users' files.  Meanwhile, the volume is comprehensively
> protected against the "left in a taxi" scenario.
> 
>> Generally speaking though, it would be great to have encryption
>> _and_ authentication for file contents.
> 
> Not good enough for me.  I want authenticated encryption for
> everything, contents or metadata.

Well, let's focus first on file contents.
We have already the fscrypo framework.

What you suggest is completely different from what we have now.

>> AEAD modes like GCM or future finalists of the CAESAR competition
>> come to mind.
> 
> GCM is problematic for block storage, primarily because it's
> catastrophic to reuse a key/IV pair.
> 
> If you naively use the same key when writing more than 2^32 blocks
> with a random IV, you've just stepped into the collision "danger
> zone" (per NIST SP 800-38D).  We have a design that involves frequent
> encryption key derivation in order to address the collision space
> problem.  But that's just one piece of the solution to the whole
> problem.
> 
>> IIRC the ext4 encryption design document mentions this, but it's
>> unclear to me why AES-GCM wasn't used for file contents from the
>> beginning. I'd guess it has to do with where to store the
>> authentication tag and performance.
> 
> Comparatively, that's the easy part.  The hard part is ensuring
> *consistency* between the ciphertext and the cryptographic metadata.
> If you write out the ciphertext and don't get the IV you used for it
> out to storage simultaneously, you've just lost the block.  And
> vice-versa.
> 
> Then there's the problem of internal consistency.  Supposing you do
> manage to get the blocks and their crypto metadata out together,
> what's to stop an attacker from punching holes (for example)?  You
> need an authenticated dictionary structure at that point, such as a
> Merkle tree or an authenticated skiplist.
> 
> Now you have an additional data structure to maintain.  And you're
> rebalancing a Merkle tree in the midst of modifications, or you're
> producing an implementation of ASL in the Linux kernel (which, BTW, my
> team does have a prototype for right now).
> 
> Once we have a root of an authenticated dictionary, we can look to a
> high-performance secure hardware element to sign that root against a
> monotonic counter to get rollback protection.
> 
> To protect the entire block device, we need the authentication data to
> be consistent with the ciphertext at the block level.  So that means
> something like copy-on-write or log-structured volume at the dm-
> layer.  Right now the best shortcut I've been able to come up starts
> with a loopback mount on btrfs.
> 
>> Does anybody have details on that?
> 
> Hopefully I've been able to shine some light on the reasons why
> high-performance random access read/write block storage encryption
> with authentication is a harder problem than it looks on the surface.
> 
> In the meantime, to address the CBC thing, I'd want to understand what
> the hardware is doing exactly.  I wouldn't want the existence of code
> that supports CBC in fs/crypto to be interpreted as some sort of
> endorsement for using it rather than XTS (when unauthenticated
> encryption is for some reason the only viable option) for new storage
> encryption applications.

The hardware offers AES-CBC, accessible via the kernel crypto API.

Thanks,
//richard
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