linux-ext4 - [PATCH] ext4: validate s_first_meta

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Message-Id: <20161129055717.4154-1-guaneryu@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 29 Nov 2016 13:57:17 +0800
From:   Eryu Guan <guaneryu@...il.com>
To:     linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     tytso@....edu, Eryu Guan <guaneryu@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time

Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.

ext4_calculate_overhead():
  buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS);  <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
  blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);

count_overhead():
  for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
          ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf);   <=== buffer overrun
          count++;
  }

This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:

  #!/bin/bash
  rm -f fs.img
  mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
  fallocate -l 16M fs.img
  mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
  debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
  mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4

Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.

Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@...t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@...il.com>
---

In e2fsprogs, we avoided a similar buffer overrun:
f66e6ce libext2fs: avoid buffer overflow if s_first_meta_bg is too big

and e2fsck could detect & fix large s_first_meta_bg:
7a4352d e2fsck: fix file systems with an overly large s_first_meta_bg

But I suspect that there's an off-by-one bug in e2fsck code, shouldn't the
upper boundary of s_first_meta_bg be (fs->desc_blocks - 1)? Something like:

 e2fsck/super.c:643
        if (ext2fs_has_feature_meta_bg(fs->super) &&
 -           (fs->super->s_first_meta_bg > fs->desc_blocks)) {
 -               pctx.group = fs->desc_blocks;
 +           (fs->super->s_first_meta_bg >= fs->desc_blocks)) {
 +               pctx.group = fs->desc_blocks - 1;
                pctx.num = fs->super->s_first_meta_bg;

 fs/ext4/super.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 52b0530..8f46a07 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -3814,6 +3814,15 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			(EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS / EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)));
 	db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
 		   EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
+	if (ext4_has_feature_meta_bg(sb)) {
+		if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_meta_bg) >= db_count) {
+			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
+				 "first meta block group too large: %u "
+				 "(group descriptor block count %u)",
+				 le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_meta_bg), db_count);
+			goto failed_mount;
+		}
+	}
 	sbi->s_group_desc = ext4_kvmalloc(db_count *
 					  sizeof(struct buffer_head *),
 					  GFP_KERNEL);
-- 
2.9.3

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