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Message-ID: <20170419001005.GA143911@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 18 Apr 2017 17:10:05 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
To:     Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@...omium.org>
Cc:     tytso@....edu, ebiggers@...gle.com, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, kinaba@...omium.org,
        hashimoto@...omium.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fscrypt: use 32 bytes of encrypted filename

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:01:36PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> 
> Strangely, f2fs and ubifs do not use the bytes from the filename at all when
> trying to find a specific directory entry in this case.  So this patch doesn't
> really affect them.  This seems unreliable; perhaps we should introduce a
> function like "fscrypt_name_matches()" which all the filesystems could call?
> Can any of the f2fs and ubifs developers explain why they don't look at any
> bytes from the filename?
> 

Just to give some ideas, here's an untested patch which does this and also
updates F2FS to start checking the filename.  UBIFS seemed more difficult so I
didn't touch it yet.

Of course, this would need to be split into a few different patches if we
actually wanted to go with it.

---

diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index 37b49894c762..1fc19a265924 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -160,12 +160,14 @@ static const char *lookup_table =
 	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,";
 
 /**
- * digest_encode() -
+ * base64_encode() -
  *
- * Encodes the input digest using characters from the set [a-zA-Z0-9_+].
- * The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string.
+ * Encode the input data using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,].
+ *
+ * Return: the length of the encoded string.  This will be 4/3 times the size of
+ *	   the input string, rounded up.
  */
-static int digest_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
+static int base64_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
 {
 	int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
 	char *cp = dst;
@@ -185,7 +187,9 @@ static int digest_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
 	return cp - dst;
 }
 
-static int digest_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
+#define BASE64_CHARS(nbytes)	DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3)
+
+static int base64_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
 {
 	int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
 	const char *p;
@@ -274,7 +278,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
 			struct fscrypt_str *oname)
 {
 	const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
-	char buf[24];
+	char buf[8 + FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 	if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
 		oname->name[0] = '.';
@@ -289,20 +293,35 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
 	if (inode->i_crypt_info)
 		return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
 
+	/* Key is unavailable.  Encode the name without decrypting it. */
+
 	if (iname->len <= FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE) {
-		oname->len = digest_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
+		/* Short name: base64-encode the ciphertext directly */
+		oname->len = base64_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
 					   oname->name);
 		return 0;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Long name.  We can't simply base64-encode the full ciphertext, since
+	 * the resulting length may exceed NAME_MAX.  Instead, base64-encode a
+	 * filesystem-provided cookie ('hash' and 'minor_hash') followed by the
+	 * last two ciphertext blocks.  It's assumed this is sufficient to
+	 * identify the directory entry on ->lookup().  It's not actually
+	 * guaranteed, but with CBC or CBC-CTS mode encryption, it's good enough
+	 * since the unused blocks will affect the used ones.
+	 */
+
 	if (hash) {
 		memcpy(buf, &hash, 4);
 		memcpy(buf + 4, &minor_hash, 4);
 	} else {
 		memset(buf, 0, 8);
 	}
-	memcpy(buf + 8, iname->name + iname->len - 16, 16);
+	memcpy(buf + 8, iname->name + iname->len - FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	       FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	oname->name[0] = '_';
-	oname->len = 1 + digest_encode(buf, 24, oname->name + 1);
+	oname->len = 1 + base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), oname->name + 1);
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
@@ -373,17 +392,21 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
 	 * We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
 	 * user-supplied name
 	 */
-	if (iname->name[0] == '_')
+	if (iname->name[0] == '_') {
 		bigname = 1;
-	if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
+		if (iname->len !=
+		    BASE64_CHARS(1 + 8 + FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE))
+			return -ENOENT;
+	} else if (iname->len > BASE64_CHARS(FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE))
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
+	fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(8 + FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
-				fname->crypto_buf.name);
+	ret = base64_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
+			    fname->crypto_buf.name);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto errout;
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index e39696e64494..f1f15b84e02f 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/fscrypt_supp.h>
 
-#define FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE	32
-
 /* Encryption parameters */
 #define FS_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE		16
 #define FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE		16
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 07e5e1405771..d1618835de12 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1237,37 +1237,23 @@ static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block)
 }
 
 /*
- * NOTE! unlike strncmp, ext4_match returns 1 for success, 0 for failure.
+ * Determine whether the filename being looked up matches the given dir_entry.
  *
- * `len <= EXT4_NAME_LEN' is guaranteed by caller.
- * `de != NULL' is guaranteed by caller.
+ * Return: true if the entry matches, otherwise false.
  */
-static inline int ext4_match(struct ext4_filename *fname,
-			     struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de)
+static inline bool ext4_match(const struct ext4_filename *fname,
+			      const struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de)
 {
-	const void *name = fname_name(fname);
-	u32 len = fname_len(fname);
+	const struct fscrypt_str *crypto_buf = NULL;
 
 	if (!de->inode)
 		return 0;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
-	if (unlikely(!name)) {
-		if (fname->usr_fname->name[0] == '_') {
-			int ret;
-			if (de->name_len < 16)
-				return 0;
-			ret = memcmp(de->name + de->name_len - 16,
-				     fname->crypto_buf.name + 8, 16);
-			return (ret == 0) ? 1 : 0;
-		}
-		name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
-		len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
-	}
+	crypto_buf = &fname->crypto_buf;
 #endif
-	if (de->name_len != len)
-		return 0;
-	return (memcmp(de->name, name, len) == 0) ? 1 : 0;
+	return fscrypt_match_dirent(fname->usr_fname, &fname->disk_name,
+				    crypto_buf, de->name, de->name_len);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1289,12 +1275,7 @@ int ext4_search_dir(struct buffer_head *bh, char *search_buf, int buf_size,
 		/* this code is executed quadratically often */
 		/* do minimal checking `by hand' */
 		if ((char *) de + de->name_len <= dlimit) {
-			res = ext4_match(fname, de);
-			if (res < 0) {
-				res = -1;
-				goto return_result;
-			}
-			if (res > 0) {
+			if (ext4_match(fname, de)) {
 				/* found a match - just to be sure, do
 				 * a full check */
 				if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh,
@@ -1843,11 +1824,7 @@ int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
 			res = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 			goto return_result;
 		}
-		/* Provide crypto context and crypto buffer to ext4 match */
-		res = ext4_match(fname, de);
-		if (res < 0)
-			goto return_result;
-		if (res > 0) {
+		if (ext4_match(fname, de)) {
 			res = -EEXIST;
 			goto return_result;
 		}
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/dir.c b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
index 8d5c62b07b28..07b80d78a9f6 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/dir.c
@@ -111,8 +111,6 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_target_dentry(struct fscrypt_name *fname,
 	struct f2fs_dir_entry *de;
 	unsigned long bit_pos = 0;
 	int max_len = 0;
-	struct fscrypt_str de_name = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
-	struct fscrypt_str *name = &fname->disk_name;
 
 	if (max_slots)
 		*max_slots = 0;
@@ -130,17 +128,10 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_target_dentry(struct fscrypt_name *fname,
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		/* encrypted case */
-		de_name.name = d->filename[bit_pos];
-		de_name.len = le16_to_cpu(de->name_len);
-
-		/* show encrypted name */
-		if (fname->hash) {
-			if (de->hash_code == cpu_to_le32(fname->hash))
-				goto found;
-		} else if (de_name.len == name->len &&
-			de->hash_code == namehash &&
-			!memcmp(de_name.name, name->name, name->len))
+		if ((fname->hash == 0 ||
+		     fname->hash == le32_to_cpu(de->hash_code)) &&
+		    fscrypt_name_matches(fname, d->filename[bit_pos],
+					 le16_to_cpu(de->name_len)))
 			goto found;
 
 		if (max_slots && max_len > *max_slots)
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt_notsupp.h b/include/linux/fscrypt_notsupp.h
index 3511ca798804..4034976bea93 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt_notsupp.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt_notsupp.h
@@ -147,6 +147,24 @@ static inline int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *inode,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline bool fscrypt_match_dirent(const struct qstr *usr_fname,
+					const struct fscrypt_str *disk_name,
+					const struct fscrypt_str *crypto_buf,
+					const char *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
+{
+	/* Encryption support disabled; use standard comparison. */
+	if (de_name_len != disk_name->len)
+		return false;
+	return !memcmp(de_name, disk_name->name, disk_name->len);
+}
+
+static inline bool fscrypt_name_matches(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
+					const char *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
+{
+	return fscrypt_match_dirent(fname->usr_fname, &fname->disk_name,
+				    &fname->crypto_buf, de_name, de_name_len);
+}
+
 /* bio.c */
 static inline void fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx,
 					     struct bio *bio)
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt_supp.h b/include/linux/fscrypt_supp.h
index a140f47e9b27..e3c9aa7209a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt_supp.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt_supp.h
@@ -57,6 +57,63 @@ extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *, u32, u32,
 extern int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
 			struct fscrypt_str *);
 
+/*
+ * Number of bytes of ciphertext from the end of the filename which the
+ * filesystem includes when encoding long encrypted filenames for presentation
+ * to userspace without the key.
+ */
+#define FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE	(2 * FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_match_dirent() - does the directory entry match the name being looked up?
+ *
+ * This is like fscrypt_name_matches(), but for filesystems which don't use the
+ * fscrypt_name structure.  (We probably should make all filesystems do the same
+ * thing...)
+ */
+static inline bool fscrypt_match_dirent(const struct qstr *usr_fname,
+					const struct fscrypt_str *disk_name,
+					const struct fscrypt_str *crypto_buf,
+					const char *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!disk_name->name)) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(usr_fname->name[0] != '_'))
+			return false;
+		if (de_name_len < FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE)
+			return false;
+		return !memcmp(de_name + de_name_len - FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE,
+			       crypto_buf->name + 8,
+			       FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	if (de_name_len != disk_name->len)
+		return false;
+	return !memcmp(de_name, disk_name->name, disk_name->len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_name_matches() - does the directory entry match the name being looked up?
+ * @fname: the name being looked up
+ * @de_name: the name from the directory entry
+ * @de_name_len: the length of @de_name in bytes
+ *
+ * Normally @fname->disk_name will be set, and in that case we simply compare
+ * that to the directory entry.  The only exception is that if we don't have the
+ * key for an encrypted directory and a filename in it is very long, then the
+ * filename presented to userspace will only have the last
+ * FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE bytes of ciphertext encoded in it, so we can only
+ * compare that portion.  Note that despite this limit, due to the use of
+ * CBC-CTS encryption there should not be any collisions.
+ *
+ * Return: true if the name matches, otherwise false.
+ */
+static inline bool fscrypt_name_matches(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
+					const char *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
+{
+	return fscrypt_match_dirent(fname->usr_fname, &fname->disk_name,
+				    &fname->crypto_buf, de_name, de_name_len);
+}
+
 /* bio.c */
 extern void fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages(struct fscrypt_ctx *, struct bio *);
 extern void fscrypt_pullback_bio_page(struct page **, bool);

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