linux-ext4 - Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20171021160302.GA2842@mail.hallyn.com>
Date:   Sat, 21 Oct 2017 11:03:02 -0500
From:   "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To:     Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@...ouin.fr>
Cc:     Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
        Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>, Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@...nel.org>,
        Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@...sity.com>,
        Joel Becker <jlbec@...lplan.org>,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
        Phillip Lougher <phillip@...ashfs.org.uk>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
        Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@...il.com>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org,
        jfs-discussion@...ts.sourceforge.net, ocfs2-devel@....oracle.com,
        linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED

Quoting Nicolas Belouin (nicolas@...ouin.fr):
> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to
> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted
> xattr is near zero.
> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as
> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It
> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs.

You say "for example".  Are you intending to add more uses?  If so, what
are they?  If not, how about renaming it CAP_TRUSTED_XATTR?

What all does allowing writes to trusted xattrs give you?  There are
the overlayfs whiteouts, what else?