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Message-ID: <20180303210729.rslsgna56zpbtgi6@sasha-lappy>
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 21:07:30 +0000
From: Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@...rosoft.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
CC: "stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org" <linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.1 0/3] ext4 encryption fixes for 4.1-stable
On Fri, Mar 02, 2018 at 02:21:10PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
>From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
>
>Hi Sasha, can you please apply these backports of ext4 encryption fixes
>to 4.1-stable? They all have equivalent fixes in 4.4-stable. Most
>important is patch 1 which prevents unprivileged users from using (or
>abusing) ext4 encryption when it hasn't been enabled on the filesystem
>by a system administrator. Patch 2 adds a missing permission check
>(CVE-2016-10318), and patch 3 is a backport that Ted sent out some
>months ago that seems to have been missed, for a bug in 4.1 that is very
>similar to the bug in 4.2+ that was assigned CVE-2017-7374.
>
>Note that ext4 encryption in 4.1 is still pretty broken and should not
>be used (even just 4.4-stable is much better); these are just the most
>important fixes that really ought to be in 4.1-stable.
>
>Eric Biggers (1):
> fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy
>
>Richard Weinberger (1):
> ext4: require encryption feature for EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
>
>Theodore Ts'o (1):
> ext4 crypto: don't regenerate the per-inode encryption key
> unnecessarily
>
> fs/ext4/crypto_fname.c | 5 +++--
> fs/ext4/crypto_key.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
> fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c | 3 +++
> fs/ext4/ext4.h | 1 +
> fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 3 +++
> fs/ext4/super.c | 3 +++
> 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
>--
>2.16.2.395.g2e18187dfd-goog
>
Applied, thank you!
--
Thanks,
Sasha
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