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Message-ID: <20180703164649.GA5353@magnolia>
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 09:46:49 -0700
From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@...cle.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@...merspace.com>,
"linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org" <linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] open_by_handle() vs. EA inodes
On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 09:15:48PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 08:57:32PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 07:38:30PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2018-06-29 at 19:19 +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> > > > On ea_inode-enabled ext4 open_by_handle() (as well as knfsd,
> > > > etc.)
> > > > can get to EA inodes as long as it knows their inumbers - just pass
> > > > it
> > > > an fhandle with zeroed version bytes and the right inumber in it.
> > > >
> > > > AFAICS, it's Not Nice(tm), especially since you can write to
> > > > those,
> > > > whether they are shared or not.
> > > >
> > > > Should we make ext4_nfs_get_inode() check for EXT4_EA_INODE_FL
> > > > and fail if it's set?
> > >
> > > handle_to_path() requires CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capabilities. Isn't that
> > > sufficiently restrictive for open_by_handle()?
> > >
> > > Concerning knfsd, people can in theory enable subtree checking to
> > > enforce checking whether or not you are in an exported subtree. In
> > > practice that breaks rename, so people are strongly encouraged to
> > > disable subtree checking, and only to export complete filesystems.
> >
> > Umm... Do we ever want those accessed via fhandles, capabilities or
> > no capabilities? IOW, is there any reason for ext4 ->fh_to_dentry()
> > to give access to such inodes? Those are implementation internals,
> > same as e.g. journal inode...
>
> Note, BTW, that journal inode will be rejected by
> if (ino < EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino != EXT4_ROOT_INO)
> return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
> in ext4_iget_normal(); EA inodes won't be, since their numbers
> are in the normal range. And looking at the commit that has
> introduced ext4_iget_normal(), I'd say that EA inodes fit the
> description in
> commit f4bb2981024fc91b23b4d09a8817c415396dbabb
> Author: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
> Date: Sun Oct 5 22:56:00 2014 -0400
>
> ext4: add ext4_iget_normal() which is to be used for dir tree lookups
>
> If there is a corrupted file system which has directory entries that
> point at reserved, metadata inodes, prohibit them from being used by
> treating them the same way we treat Boot Loader inodes --- that is,
> mark them to be bad inodes. This prohibits them from being opened,
> deleted, or modified via chmod, chown, utimes, etc.
>
> In particular, this prevents a corrupted file system which has a
> directory entry which points at the journal inode from being deleted
> and its blocks released, after which point Much Hilarity Ensues.
>
> anyway. IOW, it might be better to have that check done not in
> ext4_nfs_get_inode() but in ext4_iget_normal(), as in
> struct inode *ext4_iget_normal(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
> {
> struct inode *res;
> if (ino < EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino != EXT4_ROOT_INO)
> return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
> res = ext4_iget(sb, ino);
> if (IS_ERR(res) || likely(!(EXT4_I(res)->i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)))
> return res;
> iput(res);
> return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
> }
>
> Objections?
None here. :)
Based on my reading of how ea inodes work, these special inodes should
never be directly reachable by userspace, ever. Only the ext4 xattr
code should touch them.
--D
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