[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20181101225230.88058-11-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2018 15:52:28 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>,
Victor Hsieh <victorhsieh@...gle.com>,
Chandan Rajendra <chandan@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 10/12] ext4: add basic fs-verity support
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Add basic fs-verity support to ext4. fs-verity is a filesystem feature
that enables transparent integrity protection and authentication of
read-only files. It uses a dm-verity like mechanism at the file level:
a Merkle tree is used to verify any block in the file in log(filesize)
time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in fs/verity/.
See Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for details.
This patch adds everything except the data verification hooks that will
needed in ->readpages().
On ext4, enabling fs-verity on a file requires that the filesystem has
the 'verity' feature, e.g. that it was formatted with
'mkfs.ext4 -O verity' or had 'tune2fs -O verity' run on it.
This requires e2fsprogs 1.44.4-2 or later.
In ext4, we choose to retain the fs-verity metadata past the end of the
file rather than trying to move it into an external inode xattr, since
in practice keeping the metadata in-line actually results in the
simplest and most efficient implementation. One non-obvious advantage
of keeping the verity metadata in-line is that when fs-verity is
combined with fscrypt, the verity metadata naturally gets encrypted too;
this is actually necessary because it contains hashes of the plaintext.
We also choose to keep the on-disk i_size equal to the original file
size, in order to make the 'verity' feature a RO_COMPAT feature. Thus,
ext4 has to find the fsverity_footer by looking in the last extent.
Co-developed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
---
fs/ext4/Kconfig | 20 +++++++++++
fs/ext4/ext4.h | 20 ++++++++++-
fs/ext4/file.c | 6 ++++
fs/ext4/inode.c | 8 +++++
fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 12 +++++++
fs/ext4/super.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/ext4/sysfs.c | 6 ++++
7 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/Kconfig b/fs/ext4/Kconfig
index a453cc87082b5..5a76125ac0f8a 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/ext4/Kconfig
@@ -111,6 +111,26 @@ config EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
default y
depends on EXT4_ENCRYPTION
+config EXT4_FS_VERITY
+ bool "Ext4 Verity"
+ depends on EXT4_FS
+ select FS_VERITY
+ help
+ This option enables fs-verity for ext4. fs-verity is the
+ dm-verity mechanism implemented at the file level. Userspace
+ can append a Merkle tree (hash tree) to a file, then enable
+ fs-verity on the file. ext4 will then transparently verify
+ any data read from the file against the Merkle tree. The file
+ is also made read-only.
+
+ This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the
+ Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting
+ various use cases where normally the whole file would need to
+ be hashed at once, such as auditing and authenticity
+ verification (appraisal).
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EXT4_DEBUG
bool "EXT4 debugging support"
depends on EXT4_FS
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
index 12f90d48ba613..e5475a629ed80 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
#define __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION)
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
+#define __FS_HAS_VERITY IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY)
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
+
#include <linux/compiler.h>
/* Until this gets included into linux/compiler-gcc.h */
@@ -405,6 +408,7 @@ struct flex_groups {
#define EXT4_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000 /* Top of directory hierarchies*/
#define EXT4_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000 /* Set to each huge file */
#define EXT4_EXTENTS_FL 0x00080000 /* Inode uses extents */
+#define EXT4_VERITY_FL 0x00100000 /* Verity protected inode */
#define EXT4_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000 /* Inode used for large EA */
#define EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000 /* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */
#define EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL 0x10000000 /* Inode has inline data. */
@@ -472,6 +476,7 @@ enum {
EXT4_INODE_TOPDIR = 17, /* Top of directory hierarchies*/
EXT4_INODE_HUGE_FILE = 18, /* Set to each huge file */
EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS = 19, /* Inode uses extents */
+ EXT4_INODE_VERITY = 20, /* Verity protected inode */
EXT4_INODE_EA_INODE = 21, /* Inode used for large EA */
EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS = 22, /* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */
EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA = 28, /* Data in inode. */
@@ -517,6 +522,7 @@ static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void)
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(TOPDIR);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(HUGE_FILE);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EXTENTS);
+ CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(VERITY);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EA_INODE);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EOFBLOCKS);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(INLINE_DATA);
@@ -1654,6 +1660,7 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flags(struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM 0x0400
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_READONLY 0x1000
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT 0x2000
+#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY 0x8000
#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_COMPRESSION 0x0001
#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FILETYPE 0x0002
@@ -1742,6 +1749,7 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(bigalloc, BIGALLOC)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(metadata_csum, METADATA_CSUM)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(readonly, READONLY)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(project, PROJECT)
+EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(verity, VERITY)
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(compression, COMPRESSION)
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(filetype, FILETYPE)
@@ -1797,7 +1805,8 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(encrypt, ENCRYPT)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_BIGALLOC |\
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM|\
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_QUOTA |\
- EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT)
+ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT |\
+ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY)
#define EXTN_FEATURE_FUNCS(ver) \
static inline bool ext4_has_unknown_ext##ver##_compat_features(struct super_block *sb) \
@@ -2293,6 +2302,15 @@ static inline bool ext4_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode)
return ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT);
}
+static inline bool ext4_verity_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY
+ return ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY);
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
static inline int ext4_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *iname,
diff --git a/fs/ext4/file.c b/fs/ext4/file.c
index 69d65d49837bb..cb4b69ef01a22 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/file.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/file.c
@@ -444,6 +444,12 @@ static int ext4_file_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
if (ret)
return ret;
+ if (ext4_verity_inode(inode)) {
+ ret = fsverity_file_open(inode, filp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
/*
* Set up the jbd2_inode if we are opening the inode for
* writing and the journal is present
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c
index 05f01fbd9c7fb..c624c83bbad26 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -4723,6 +4723,8 @@ static bool ext4_should_use_dax(struct inode *inode)
return false;
if (ext4_encrypted_inode(inode))
return false;
+ if (ext4_verity_inode(inode))
+ return false;
return true;
}
@@ -5505,6 +5507,12 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if (error)
return error;
+ if (ext4_verity_inode(inode)) {
+ error = fsverity_prepare_setattr(dentry, attr);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
if (is_quota_modification(inode, attr)) {
error = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (error)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
index 0edee31913d1f..9bb6cc1ae8ceb 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
@@ -1020,6 +1020,16 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+ case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
+ if (!ext4_has_feature_verity(sb))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return fsverity_ioctl_enable(filp, (const void __user *)arg);
+
+ case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
+ if (!ext4_has_feature_verity(sb))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return fsverity_ioctl_measure(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+
case EXT4_IOC_FSGETXATTR:
{
struct fsxattr fa;
@@ -1138,6 +1148,8 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT:
case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
+ case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
+ case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
case EXT4_IOC_SHUTDOWN:
case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP:
break;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index a221f1cdf7046..c4a66b64ea604 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -1144,6 +1144,7 @@ void ext4_clear_inode(struct inode *inode)
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode = NULL;
}
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode);
+ fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode);
}
static struct inode *ext4_nfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
@@ -1315,6 +1316,93 @@ static const struct fscrypt_operations ext4_cryptops = {
};
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY
+static int ext4_set_verity(struct inode *inode, loff_t data_i_size)
+{
+ int err;
+ handle_t *handle;
+ struct ext4_iloc iloc;
+
+ err = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
+ ext4_warning_inode(inode,
+ "fs-verity is only allowed on extent-based files");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove extents past EOF; see ext4_get_verity_full_size() */
+ err = ext4_truncate(inode);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_INODE, 1);
+ if (IS_ERR(handle))
+ return PTR_ERR(handle);
+ err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
+ if (err == 0) {
+ ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY);
+ EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = data_i_size;
+ err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
+ }
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the offset, in bytes, to the end of the verity metadata. Ext4
+ * stores the verity metadata beyond EOF, but sets the on-disk i_size to the
+ * original data size in order to make verity an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature.
+ * Therefore, it has to compute the end offset implicitly via the end of the
+ * last extent. Trailing zeroes after the footer are tolerated.
+ */
+static int ext4_get_metadata_end(struct inode *inode, loff_t *metadata_end_ret)
+{
+ struct ext4_ext_path *path;
+ struct ext4_extent *last_extent;
+ u32 end_lblk;
+ int err;
+
+ if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "verity file has inline data");
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
+ if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "verity file doesn't use extents");
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
+ path = ext4_find_extent(inode, EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - 1, NULL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(path))
+ return PTR_ERR(path);
+
+ last_extent = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
+ if (!last_extent) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "verity file has no extents");
+ err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto out_drop_path;
+ }
+
+ end_lblk = le32_to_cpu(last_extent->ee_block) +
+ ext4_ext_get_actual_len(last_extent);
+ *metadata_end_ret = (loff_t)end_lblk << inode->i_blkbits;
+ err = 0;
+out_drop_path:
+ ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
+ kfree(path);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops = {
+ .set_verity = ext4_set_verity,
+ .get_metadata_end = ext4_get_metadata_end,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
static const char * const quotatypes[] = INITQFNAMES;
#define QTYPE2NAME(t) (quotatypes[t])
@@ -4146,6 +4234,9 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
sb->s_cop = &ext4_cryptops;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY
+ sb->s_vop = &ext4_verityops;
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb))
diff --git a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c
index 9212a026a1f12..8e86087c2f039 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/sysfs.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/sysfs.c
@@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(meta_bg_resize);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(encryption);
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY
+EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(verity);
+#endif
EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(metadata_csum_seed);
static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = {
@@ -235,6 +238,9 @@ static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = {
ATTR_LIST(meta_bg_resize),
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
ATTR_LIST(encryption),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_VERITY
+ ATTR_LIST(verity),
#endif
ATTR_LIST(metadata_csum_seed),
NULL,
--
2.19.1.568.g152ad8e336-goog
Powered by blists - more mailing lists