linux-ext4 - Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device

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Message-ID: <20190110101757.GC15790@quack2.suse.cz>
Date:   Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:17:57 +0100
From:   Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
To:     Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>
Cc:     Pankaj Gupta <pagupta@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
        linux-nvdimm@...1.01.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-acpi@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org, jack@...e.cz, stefanha@...hat.com,
        dan.j.williams@...el.com, riel@...riel.com, nilal@...hat.com,
        kwolf@...hat.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, zwisler@...nel.org,
        vishal.l.verma@...el.com, dave.jiang@...el.com, david@...hat.com,
        jmoyer@...hat.com, xiaoguangrong.eric@...il.com, hch@...radead.org,
        mst@...hat.com, jasowang@...hat.com, lcapitulino@...hat.com,
        imammedo@...hat.com, eblake@...hat.com, willy@...radead.org,
        tytso@....edu, adilger.kernel@...ger.ca, darrick.wong@...cle.com,
        rjw@...ysocki.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] kvm "virtio pmem" device

On Thu 10-01-19 12:26:17, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 09, 2019 at 08:17:31PM +0530, Pankaj Gupta wrote:
> >  This patch series has implementation for "virtio pmem". 
> >  "virtio pmem" is fake persistent memory(nvdimm) in guest 
> >  which allows to bypass the guest page cache. This also
> >  implements a VIRTIO based asynchronous flush mechanism.  
> 
> Hmmmm. Sharing the host page cache direct into the guest VM. Sounds
> like a good idea, but.....
> 
> This means the guest VM can now run timing attacks to observe host
> side page cache residency, and depending on the implementation I'm
> guessing that the guest will be able to control host side page
> cache eviction, too (e.g. via discard or hole punch operations).
> 
> Which means this functionality looks to me like a new vector for
> information leakage into and out of the guest VM via guest
> controlled host page cache manipulation.
> 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.01161
> 
> I might be wrong, but if I'm not we're going to have to be very
> careful about how guest VMs can access and manipulate host side
> resources like the page cache.....

Right. Thinking about this I would be more concerned about the fact that
guest can effectively pin amount of host's page cache upto size of the
device/file passed to guest as PMEM, can't it Pankaj? Or is there some QEMU
magic that avoids this?

								Honza
-- 
Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>
SUSE Labs, CR