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Date:   Thu, 6 Jun 2019 10:21:12 -0700
From:   Linus Torvalds <>
To:     Eric Biggers <>
        linux-fsdevel <>,
        Linux API <>,, Jaegeuk Kim <>,
        "Theodore Y . Ts'o" <>,
        Victor Hsieh <>,
        Dave Chinner <>,
        Christoph Hellwig <>,
        "Darrick J . Wong" <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/16] fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection

On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 8:54 AM Eric Biggers <> wrote:
> This is a redesigned version of the fs-verity patchset, implementing
> Ted's suggestion to build the Merkle tree in the kernel
> (
> This greatly simplifies the UAPI, since the verity metadata no longer
> needs to be transferred to the kernel.

Interfaces look sane to me. My only real concern is whether it would
make sense to make the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl be something that
could be done incrementally, since the way it is done now it looks
like any random user could create a big file and then do the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make the kernel do a _very_ expensive

Yes, I see the

+               if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+                       return -EINTR;
+               cond_resched();

in there, so it's not like it's some entirely unkillable thing, and
maybe we don't care as a result. But maybe the ioctl interface could
be fundamentally restartable?

If that was already considered and people just went "too complex", never mind.


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