Message-ID: <20190622221708.GE19686@jaegeuk-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com>
Date:   Sat, 22 Jun 2019 15:17:08 -0700
From:   Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        "Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Victor Hsieh <victorhsieh@...gle.com>,
        Chandan Rajendra <chandan@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Dave Chinner <david@...morbit.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        "Darrick J . Wong" <darrick.wong@...cle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 05/16] fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions
 for hashing

On 06/20, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> 
> Add the beginnings of the fs/verity/ support layer, including the
> Kconfig option and various helper functions for hashing.  To start, only
> SHA-256 is supported, but other hash algorithms can easily be added.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>

Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>

> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> ---
>  fs/Kconfig                   |   2 +
>  fs/Makefile                  |   1 +
>  fs/verity/Kconfig            |  38 +++++
>  fs/verity/Makefile           |   4 +
>  fs/verity/fsverity_private.h |  88 +++++++++++
>  fs/verity/hash_algs.c        | 274 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  fs/verity/init.c             |  41 ++++++
>  7 files changed, 448 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 fs/verity/Kconfig
>  create mode 100644 fs/verity/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
>  create mode 100644 fs/verity/hash_algs.c
>  create mode 100644 fs/verity/init.c
> 
> diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig
> index f1046cf6ad85e0..4b66dafbdc7b1c 100644
> --- a/fs/Kconfig
> +++ b/fs/Kconfig
> @@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ config MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING
>  
>  source "fs/crypto/Kconfig"
>  
> +source "fs/verity/Kconfig"
> +
>  source "fs/notify/Kconfig"
>  
>  source "fs/quota/Kconfig"
> diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
> index c9aea23aba560c..fe7f2c07f482e1 100644
> --- a/fs/Makefile
> +++ b/fs/Makefile
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AIO)               += aio.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_IO_URING)		+= io_uring.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FS_DAX)		+= dax.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)	+= crypto/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY)		+= verity/
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING)      += locks.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT)		+= compat.o compat_ioctl.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_AOUT)	+= binfmt_aout.o
> diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000000000..c2bca0b01ecfa9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +config FS_VERITY
> +	bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)"
> +	select CRYPTO
> +	# SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm.
> +	# To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly.
> +	select CRYPTO_SHA256
> +	help
> +	  This option enables fs-verity.  fs-verity is the dm-verity
> +	  mechanism implemented at the file level.  On supported
> +	  filesystems (currently EXT4 and F2FS), userspace can use an
> +	  ioctl to enable verity for a file, which causes the filesystem
> +	  to build a Merkle tree for the file.  The filesystem will then
> +	  transparently verify any data read from the file against the
> +	  Merkle tree.  The file is also made read-only.
> +
> +	  This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the
> +	  Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting
> +	  various use cases where normally the whole file would need to
> +	  be hashed at once, such as: (a) auditing (logging the file's
> +	  hash), or (b) authenticity verification (comparing the hash
> +	  against a known good value, e.g. from a digital signature).
> +
> +	  fs-verity is especially useful on large files where not all
> +	  the contents may actually be needed.  Also, fs-verity verifies
> +	  data each time it is paged back in, which provides better
> +	  protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash.
> +
> +	  If unsure, say N.
> +
> +config FS_VERITY_DEBUG
> +	bool "FS Verity debugging"
> +	depends on FS_VERITY
> +	help
> +	  Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default.
> +
> +	  Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer.
> diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000000000..398f3f85fa184b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += hash_algs.o \
> +			   init.o
> diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000000000..9697aaebb5dc1f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
> + *
> + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
> +#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
> +#define DEBUG
> +#endif
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
> +
> +#include <crypto/sha.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
> +
> +struct ahash_request;
> +
> +/*
> + * Implementation limit: maximum depth of the Merkle tree.  For now 8 is plenty;
> + * it's enough for over U64_MAX bytes of data using SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
> + */
> +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS		8
> +
> +/*
> + * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
> + * Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
> + */
> +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
> +
> +/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
> +struct fsverity_hash_alg {
> +	struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* hash tfm, allocated on demand */
> +	const char *name;	  /* crypto API name, e.g. sha256 */
> +	unsigned int digest_size; /* digest size in bytes, e.g. 32 for SHA-256 */
> +	unsigned int block_size;  /* block size in bytes, e.g. 64 for SHA-256 */
> +};
> +
> +/* Merkle tree parameters: hash algorithm, initial hash state, and topology */
> +struct merkle_tree_params {
> +	const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; /* the hash algorithm */
> +	const u8 *hashstate;		/* initial hash state or NULL */
> +	unsigned int digest_size;	/* same as hash_alg->digest_size */
> +	unsigned int block_size;	/* size of data and tree blocks */
> +	unsigned int hashes_per_block;	/* number of hashes per tree block */
> +	unsigned int log_blocksize;	/* log2(block_size) */
> +	unsigned int log_arity;		/* log2(hashes_per_block) */
> +	unsigned int num_levels;	/* number of levels in Merkle tree */
> +	u64 tree_size;			/* Merkle tree size in bytes */
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0)
> +	 * to root level ('num_levels - 1')
> +	 */
> +	u64 level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
> +};
> +
> +/* hash_algs.c */
> +
> +extern struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[];
> +
> +const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
> +						      unsigned int num);
> +const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
> +				      const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
> +int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
> +		       const struct inode *inode,
> +		       struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out);
> +int fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
> +			 const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out);
> +void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void);
> +
> +/* init.c */
> +
> +extern void __printf(3, 4) __cold
> +fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
> +	     const char *fmt, ...);
> +
> +#define fsverity_warn(inode, fmt, ...)		\
> +	fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_WARNING, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
> +#define fsverity_err(inode, fmt, ...)		\
> +	fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
> +
> +#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */
> diff --git a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000000000..46df17094fc252
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * fs/verity/hash_algs.c: fs-verity hash algorithms
> + *
> + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#include "fsverity_private.h"
> +
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +
> +/* The hash algorithms supported by fs-verity */
> +struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[] = {
> +	[FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256] = {
> +		.name = "sha256",
> +		.digest_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
> +		.block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
> +	},
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_get_hash_alg() - validate and prepare a hash algorithm
> + * @inode: optional inode for logging purposes
> + * @num: the hash algorithm number
> + *
> + * Get the struct fsverity_hash_alg for the given hash algorithm number, and
> + * ensure it has a hash transform ready to go.  The hash transforms are
> + * allocated on-demand so that we don't waste resources unnecessarily, and
> + * because the crypto modules may be initialized later than fs/verity/.
> + *
> + * Return: pointer to the hash alg on success, else an ERR_PTR()
> + */
> +const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
> +						      unsigned int num)
> +{
> +	struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg;
> +	struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (num >= ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs) ||
> +	    !fsverity_hash_algs[num].name) {
> +		fsverity_warn(inode, "Unknown hash algorithm number: %u", num);
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +	}
> +	alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[num];
> +
> +	/* pairs with cmpxchg() below */
> +	tfm = READ_ONCE(alg->tfm);
> +	if (likely(tfm != NULL))
> +		return alg;
> +	/*
> +	 * Using the shash API would make things a bit simpler, but the ahash
> +	 * API is preferable as it allows the use of crypto accelerators.
> +	 */
> +	tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->name, 0, 0);
> +	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> +		if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT)
> +			fsverity_warn(inode,
> +				      "Missing crypto API support for hash algorithm \"%s\"",
> +				      alg->name);
> +		else
> +			fsverity_err(inode,
> +				     "Error allocating hash algorithm \"%s\": %ld",
> +				     alg->name, PTR_ERR(tfm));
> +		return ERR_CAST(tfm);
> +	}
> +
> +	err = -EINVAL;
> +	if (WARN_ON(alg->digest_size != crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)))
> +		goto err_free_tfm;
> +	if (WARN_ON(alg->block_size != crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm)))
> +		goto err_free_tfm;
> +
> +	pr_info("%s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
> +		alg->name, crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm));
> +
> +	/* pairs with READ_ONCE() above */
> +	if (cmpxchg(&alg->tfm, NULL, tfm) != NULL)
> +		crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
> +
> +	return alg;
> +
> +err_free_tfm:
> +	crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
> +	return ERR_PTR(err);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_prepare_hash_state() - precompute the initial hash state
> + * @alg: hash algorithm
> + * @salt: a salt which is to be prepended to all data to be hashed
> + * @salt_size: salt size in bytes, possibly 0
> + *
> + * Return: NULL if the salt is empty, otherwise the kmalloc()'ed precomputed
> + *	   initial hash state on success or an ERR_PTR() on failure.
> + */
> +const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
> +				      const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size)
> +{
> +	u8 *hashstate = NULL;
> +	struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
> +	u8 *padded_salt = NULL;
> +	size_t padded_salt_size;
> +	struct scatterlist sg;
> +	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (salt_size == 0)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	hashstate = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(alg->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!hashstate)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> +	req = ahash_request_alloc(alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!req) {
> +		err = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto err_free;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Zero-pad the salt to the next multiple of the input size of the hash
> +	 * algorithm's compression function, e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-256 or 128
> +	 * bytes for SHA-512.  This ensures that the hash algorithm won't have
> +	 * any bytes buffered internally after processing the salt, thus making
> +	 * salted hashing just as fast as unsalted hashing.
> +	 */
> +	padded_salt_size = round_up(salt_size, alg->block_size);
> +	padded_salt = kzalloc(padded_salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!padded_salt) {
> +		err = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto err_free;
> +	}
> +	memcpy(padded_salt, salt, salt_size);
> +
> +	sg_init_one(&sg, padded_salt, padded_salt_size);
> +	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
> +					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> +				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
> +	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, padded_salt_size);
> +
> +	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto err_free;
> +
> +	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto err_free;
> +
> +	err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto err_free;
> +out:
> +	kfree(padded_salt);
> +	ahash_request_free(req);
> +	return hashstate;
> +
> +err_free:
> +	kfree(hashstate);
> +	hashstate = ERR_PTR(err);
> +	goto out;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_hash_page() - hash a single data or hash page
> + * @params: the Merkle tree's parameters
> + * @inode: inode for which the hashing is being done
> + * @req: preallocated hash request
> + * @page: the page to hash
> + * @out: output digest, size 'params->digest_size' bytes
> + *
> + * Hash a single data or hash block, assuming block_size == PAGE_SIZE.
> + * The hash is salted if a salt is specified in the Merkle tree parameters.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
> + */
> +int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
> +		       const struct inode *inode,
> +		       struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out)
> +{
> +	struct scatterlist sg;
> +	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
> +	sg_set_page(&sg, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
> +	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
> +					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> +				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
> +	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +	if (params->hashstate) {
> +		err = crypto_ahash_import(req, params->hashstate);
> +		if (err) {
> +			fsverity_err(inode,
> +				     "Error %d importing hash state", err);
> +			return err;
> +		}
> +		err = crypto_ahash_finup(req);
> +	} else {
> +		err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
> +	}
> +
> +	err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
> +	if (err)
> +		fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing page hash", err);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_hash_buffer() - hash some data
> + * @alg: the hash algorithm to use
> + * @data: the data to hash
> + * @size: size of data to hash
> + * @out: output digest, size 'alg->digest_size' bytes
> + *
> + * Hash some data which is located in physically contiguous memory (i.e. memory
> + * allocated by kmalloc(), not by vmalloc()).  No salt is used.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
> + */
> +int fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
> +			 const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out)
> +{
> +	struct ahash_request *req;
> +	struct scatterlist sg;
> +	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> +	int err;
> +
> +	req = ahash_request_alloc(alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!req)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	sg_init_one(&sg, data, size);
> +	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
> +					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> +				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
> +	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, size);
> +
> +	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
> +
> +	ahash_request_free(req);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void)
> +{
> +	size_t i;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Sanity check the hash algorithms (could be a build-time check, but
> +	 * they're in an array)
> +	 */
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) {
> +		const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[i];
> +
> +		if (!alg->name)
> +			continue;
> +
> +		BUG_ON(alg->digest_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * For efficiency, the implementation currently assumes the
> +		 * digest and block sizes are powers of 2.  This limitation can
> +		 * be lifted if the code is updated to handle other values.
> +		 */
> +		BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->digest_size));
> +		BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->block_size));
> +	}
> +}
> diff --git a/fs/verity/init.c b/fs/verity/init.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000000000..40076bbe452a48
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/init.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * fs/verity/init.c: fs-verity module initialization and logging
> + *
> + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#include "fsverity_private.h"
> +
> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
> +
> +void fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
> +		  const char *fmt, ...)
> +{
> +	static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
> +				      DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
> +	struct va_format vaf;
> +	va_list args;
> +
> +	if (!__ratelimit(&rs))
> +		return;
> +
> +	va_start(args, fmt);
> +	vaf.fmt = fmt;
> +	vaf.va = &args;
> +	if (inode)
> +		printk("%sfs-verity (%s, inode %lu): %pV\n",
> +		       level, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, &vaf);
> +	else
> +		printk("%sfs-verity: %pV\n", level, &vaf);
> +	va_end(args);
> +}
> +
> +static int __init fsverity_init(void)
> +{
> +	fsverity_check_hash_algs();
> +
> +	pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n");
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +late_initcall(fsverity_init)
> -- 
> 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog

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