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Message-ID: <20190915072705.GA12869@darwi-home-pc>
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2019 09:27:05 +0200
From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>
To: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.3-rc8
On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 08:51:42AM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Sa, 14.09.19 09:30, Linus Torvalds (torvalds@...ux-foundation.org) wrote:
[...]
>
> And please don't break /dev/urandom again. The above code is the ony
> way I see how we can make /dev/urandom-derived swap encryption safe,
> and the only way I can see how we can sanely write a valid random seed
> to disk after boot.
>
Any hope in making systemd-random-seed(8) credit that "random seed
from previous boot" file, through RNDADDENTROPY, *by default*?
Because of course this makes the problem reliably go away on my system
too (as discussed in the original bug report, but you were not CCed).
I know that by v243, just released 12 days ago, this can be optionally
done through SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT=1. I wonder though if it can
ever be done by default, just like what the BSDs does... This would
solve a big part of the current problem.
> Lennart
thanks,
--
darwi
http://darwish.chasingpointers.com
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