linux-ext4 - Re: [PATCH RFC v3] random: getrandom(2): optionally block when CRNG is uninitialized

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Message-ID: <20190915100201.GA2663@darwi-home-pc>
Date:   Sun, 15 Sep 2019 12:02:01 +0200
From:   "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>
To:     Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc:     Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
        Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
        William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
        zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3] random: getrandom(2): optionally block when CRNG
 is uninitialized

On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 11:30:57AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 10:59:07AM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> > We live in a world where people run HTTPS, SSH, and all that stuff in
> > the initrd already. It's where SSH host keys are generated, and plenty
> > session keys.
> 
> It is exactly the type of crap that create this situation : making
> people developing such scripts believe that any random source was OK
> to generate these, and as such forcing urandom to produce crypto-solid
> randoms!

Willy, let's tone it down please... the thread is already getting a
bit toxic.

> No, distro developers must know that it's not acceptable to
> generate lifetime crypto keys from the early boot when no entropy is
> available. At least with this change they will get an error returned
> from getrandom() and will be able to ask the user to feed entropy, or
> be able to say "it was impossible to generate the SSH key right now,
> the daemon will only be started once it's possible", or "the SSH key
> we produced will not be saved because it's not safe and is only usable
> for this recovery session".
> 
> > If Linux lets all that stuff run with awful entropy then
> > you pretend things where secure while they actually aren't. It's much
> > better to fail loudly in that case, I am sure.
> 
> This is precisely what this change permits : fail instead of block
> by default, and let applications decide based on the use case.
>

Unfortunately, not exactly.

Linus didn't want getrandom to return an error code / "to fail" in
that case, but to silently return CRNG-uninitialized /dev/urandom
data, to avoid user-space even working around the error code through
busy-loops.

I understand the rationale behind that, of course, and this is what
I've done so far in the V3 RFC.

Nonetheless, this _will_, for example, make systemd-random-seed(8)
save week seeds under /var/lib/systemd/random-seed, since the kernel
didn't inform it about such weakness at all..

The situation is so bad now, that it's more of "some user-space are
more equal than others".. Let's just at least admit this while
discussing the RFC patch in question.

thanks,

> > Quite frankly, I don't think this is something to fix in the
> > kernel.
> 
> As long as it offers a single API to return randoms, and that it is
> not possible not to block for low-quality randoms, it needs to be
> at least addressed there. Then userspace can adapt. For now userspace
> does not have this option just due to the kernel's way of exposing
> randoms.
> 
> Willy