linux-ext4 - Re: Linux 5.3-rc8

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Message-ID: <89aeae9d-0bca-2a59-5ce2-1e18f6479936@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Date:   Wed, 18 Sep 2019 11:33:39 +0200
From:   Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>
Cc:     "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
        Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
        William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
        zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.3-rc8

On 17/09/2019 22.58, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> Side note, and entirely unrelated to this particular problem, but
> _because_ I was looking at the entropy init and sources of randomness
> we have, I notice that we still don't use the ToD clock as a source.

And unrelated to the non-use of the RTC (which I agree seems weird), but
because there's no better place in this thread: How "random" is the
contents of RAM after boot? Sure, for virtualized environments one
probably always gets zeroed pages from the host (otherwise the host has
a problem...), and on PCs maybe the BIOS interferes.

But for cheap embedded devices with non-ECC RAM and not a lot of
value-add firmware between power-on and start_kernel(), would it make
sense to read a few MB of memory outside of where the kernel was loaded
and feed those to add_device_randomness() (of course, doing it as early
as possible, maybe first thing in start_kernel())? Or do the reading in
the bootloader and pass on the sha256() in the DT/rng-seed property?

A quick "kitchen-table" experiment with the board I have on my desk
shows that there are at least some randomness to be had after a cold boot.

Maybe this has already been suggested and rejected?

Rasmus