[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20200513005538.GF1596452@mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 20:55:38 -0400
From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>,
Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] fscrypt: add fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key()
On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 04:32:49PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
>
> Currently, the test_dummy_encryption mount option (which is used for
> encryption I/O testing with xfstests) uses v1 encryption policies, and
> it relies on userspace inserting a test key into the session keyring.
>
> We need test_dummy_encryption to support v2 encryption policies too.
> Requiring userspace to add the test key doesn't work well with v2
> policies, since v2 policies only support the filesystem keyring (not the
> session keyring), and keys in the filesystem keyring are lost when the
> filesystem is unmounted. Hooking all test code that unmounts and
> re-mounts the filesystem would be difficult.
>
> Instead, let's make the filesystem automatically add the test key to its
> keyring when test_dummy_encryption is enabled.
>
> That puts the responsibility for choosing the test key on the kernel.
> We could just hard-code a key. But out of paranoia, let's first try
> using a per-boot random key, to prevent this code from being misused.
> A per-boot key will work as long as no one expects dummy-encrypted files
> to remain accessible after a reboot. (gce-xfstests doesn't.)
>
> Therefore, this patch adds a function fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() which
> implements the above. The next patch will use it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists