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Message-ID: <20200923062456.GF9538@sol.localdomain>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 23:24:56 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@...gle.com>
Cc: "Theodore Y . Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org,
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>,
kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] f2fs: Handle casefolding with Encryption
On Wed, Sep 23, 2020 at 01:01:51AM +0000, Daniel Rosenberg wrote:
> Expand f2fs's casefolding support to include encrypted directories. To
> index casefolded+encrypted directories, we use the SipHash of the
> casefolded name, keyed by a key derived from the directory's fscrypt
> master key. This ensures that the dirhash doesn't leak information
> about the plaintext filenames.
>
> Encryption keys are unavailable during roll-forward recovery, so we
> can't compute the dirhash when recovering a new dentry in an encrypted +
> casefolded directory. To avoid having to force a checkpoint when a new
> file is fsync'ed, store the dirhash on-disk appended to i_name.
>
> This patch incorporates work by Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> and Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>.
>
> Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@...gle.com>
> ---
Generally looks good. If it's needed, you can add:
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
(Though, some may claim I can't give Reviewed-by since this patch already has my
Co-developed-by.)
One comment below, though:
> @@ -218,9 +219,28 @@ static bool f2fs_match_ci_name(const struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
> {
> const struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
> const struct unicode_map *um = sb->s_encoding;
> + struct fscrypt_str decrypted_name = FSTR_INIT(NULL, de_name_len);
> struct qstr entry = QSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len);
> int res;
>
> + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) {
> + const struct fscrypt_str encrypted_name =
> + FSTR_INIT((u8 *)de_name, de_name_len);
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)))
> + return false;
> +
> + decrypted_name.name = kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!decrypted_name.name)
> + return false;
> + res = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, 0, 0, &encrypted_name,
> + &decrypted_name);
> + if (res < 0)
> + goto out;
We probably should be passing up errors from here to f2fs_match_name(), then to
f2fs_find_target_dentry(), then to f2fs_find_in_inline_dir() or find_in_block().
Ignoring the filename may be okay if fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() returns
-EUCLEAN, indicating that it's invalid. However, if the error is -ENOMEM,
either from the kmalloc() or from fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(), then the caller
should receive an error rather than the filename being ignored.
- Eric
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