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Message-Id: <20201029003252.2128653-29-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 01:32:46 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@...l.parknet.co.jp>,
Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@...reload.com>,
Mrunal Patel <mpatel@...hat.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alban Crequy <alban@...volk.io>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
Stéphane Graber <stgraber@...ntu.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@...ttering.net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, smbarber@...omium.org,
Phil Estes <estesp@...il.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-audit@...hat.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Subject: [PATCH 28/34] audit: handle idmapped mounts
Audit will sometimes log the inode's i_uid and i_gid. Enable audit to log the
mapped inode when it is accessed from an idmapped mount.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 14 +++++++-------
include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++++----
ipc/mqueue.c | 8 ++++----
kernel/auditsc.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index d6dbfab126d7..545ce391a12d 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
- audit_inode(nd->name, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
+ audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_LINK, "follow_link");
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -2413,7 +2413,7 @@ int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
retval = path_lookupat(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
if (likely(!retval))
- audit_inode(name, path->dentry,
+ audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(path->mnt), path->dentry,
flags & LOOKUP_MOUNTPOINT ? AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL : 0);
restore_nameidata();
putname(name);
@@ -2455,7 +2455,7 @@ static struct filename *filename_parentat(int dfd, struct filename *name,
if (likely(!retval)) {
*last = nd.last;
*type = nd.last_type;
- audit_inode(name, parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+ audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(parent->mnt), parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
} else {
putname(name);
name = ERR_PTR(retval);
@@ -3239,7 +3239,7 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
if (unlikely(error))
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
- audit_inode(nd->name, dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+ audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
/* trailing slashes? */
if (unlikely(nd->last.name[nd->last.len]))
return ERR_PTR(-EISDIR);
@@ -3305,7 +3305,7 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
return error;
}
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
- audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
+ audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), nd->path.dentry, 0);
if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
if ((open_flag & O_EXCL) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
return -EEXIST;
@@ -3414,7 +3414,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
goto out2;
dput(path.dentry);
path.dentry = child;
- audit_inode(nd->name, child, 0);
+ audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, child, 0);
/* Don't check for other permissions, the inode was just created */
error = may_open(&path, 0, op->open_flag);
if (error)
@@ -3433,7 +3433,7 @@ static int do_o_path(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct file *file)
struct path path;
int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags, &path);
if (!error) {
- audit_inode(nd->name, path.dentry, 0);
+ audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, 0);
error = vfs_open(&path, file);
path_put(&path);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index b3d859831a31..217d2b0c273e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -293,8 +293,8 @@ extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
extern struct filename *__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr);
extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
extern void __audit_getcwd(void);
-extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
- unsigned int flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags);
extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
const struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -357,10 +357,11 @@ static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
__audit_getcwd();
}
static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns,
const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int aflags) {
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
- __audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
+ __audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, aflags);
}
static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
{
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
const struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
- __audit_inode(name, dentry,
+ __audit_inode(name, &init_user_ns, dentry,
AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN);
}
static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
@@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
{ }
static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns,
const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int aflags)
{ }
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index beff0cfcd1e8..08ade6410563 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -849,8 +849,8 @@ static void remove_notification(struct mqueue_inode_info *info)
info->notify_user_ns = NULL;
}
-static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
- umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
+static int prepare_open(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int oflag, int ro, umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
struct mq_attr *attr)
{
static const int oflag2acc[O_ACCMODE] = { MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE,
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
mqueue_create_attr, attr);
}
/* it already existed */
- audit_inode(name, dentry, 0);
+ audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, 0);
if ((oflag & (O_CREAT|O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT|O_EXCL))
return -EEXIST;
if ((oflag & O_ACCMODE) == (O_RDWR | O_WRONLY))
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ static int do_mq_open(const char __user *u_name, int oflag, umode_t mode,
goto out_putfd;
}
path.mnt = mntget(mnt);
- error = prepare_open(path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
+ error = prepare_open(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
if (!error) {
struct file *file = dentry_open(&path, oflag, current_cred());
if (!IS_ERR(file))
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 9cdecdea61d9..0dc26fcf4742 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1936,6 +1936,7 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
}
static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns,
const struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
@@ -1944,7 +1945,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
if (!dentry)
return 0;
- rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+ rc = get_mapped_vfs_caps_from_disk(user_ns, dentry, &caps);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1960,21 +1961,22 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
- struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
- name->uid = inode->i_uid;
- name->gid = inode->i_gid;
+ name->uid = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
+ name->gid = i_gid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
}
- audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+ audit_copy_fcaps(name, user_ns, dentry);
}
/**
@@ -1983,8 +1985,8 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
* @dentry: dentry being audited
* @flags: attributes for this particular entry
*/
-void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
- unsigned int flags)
+void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+ const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -2078,12 +2080,12 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
}
handle_path(dentry);
- audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
+ audit_copy_inode(n, user_ns, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
}
void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
{
- __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
+ __audit_inode(NULL, mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt), file->f_path.dentry, 0);
}
/**
@@ -2175,7 +2177,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
if (!n)
return;
- audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
+ audit_copy_inode(n, &init_user_ns, NULL, parent, 0);
}
if (!found_child) {
@@ -2194,7 +2196,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
}
if (inode)
- audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
+ audit_copy_inode(found_child, &init_user_ns, dentry, inode, 0);
else
found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
}
--
2.29.0
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