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Date:   Fri,  4 Dec 2020 00:57:26 +0100
From:   Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To:     Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
        OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@...l.parknet.co.jp>,
        Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@...reload.com>,
        Mrunal Patel <mpatel@...hat.com>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alban Crequy <alban@...volk.io>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
        Stéphane Graber <stgraber@...ntu.com>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
        Lennart Poettering <lennart@...ttering.net>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, smbarber@...omium.org,
        Phil Estes <estesp@...il.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Subject: [PATCH v4 30/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts

When executing a setuid binary the kernel will verify in bprm_fill_uid()
that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace before
setting the callers uid and gid. Let bprm_fill_uid() handle idmapped
mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped
according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.

Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
unchanged

/* v3 */
unchanged

/* v4 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>:
  - Use "mnt_userns" to refer to a vfsmount's userns everywhere to make
    terminology consistent.
---
 fs/exec.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1efcda495708..05d5009eeba7 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1567,6 +1567,7 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 {
 	/* Handle suid and sgid on files */
+	struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	unsigned int mode;
 	kuid_t uid;
@@ -1583,13 +1584,15 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 	if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)))
 		return;
 
+	mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt);
+
 	/* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */
 	inode_lock(inode);
 
 	/* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */
 	mode = inode->i_mode;
-	uid = inode->i_uid;
-	gid = inode->i_gid;
+	uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+	gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 
 	/* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */
-- 
2.29.2

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