Message-ID: <YBINYhAlBhQogk/+@google.com>
Date:   Wed, 27 Jan 2021 17:03:30 -0800
From:   Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
        Victor Hsieh <victorhsieh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl

On 01/15, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> 
> Add an ioctl FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA which will allow reading verity
> metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:
> 
> - The Merkle tree
> - The fsverity_descriptor (not including the signature if present)
> - The built-in signature, if present
> 
> This ioctl has similar semantics to pread().  It is passed the type of
> metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and
> size.  It returns the number of bytes read or an error.
> 
> Separate patches will add support for each of the above metadata types.
> This patch just adds the ioctl itself.
> 
> This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is
> stored on-disk.  It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but
> that's basically already the case:
> 
> - The Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor are defined by how fs-verity
>   file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section
>   of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst.  Technically, the way in
>   which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't
>   previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.
> 
> - The built-in signature is the value passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
> 
> This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that
> takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the
> client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file.
> This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the
> server needs to provide the storage for the client.
> 
> More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to
> export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs".
> This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which
> provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the
> traditional "host".  A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and
> perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that
> have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or
> requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
> 
> Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it
> in separate files for serving.  However, that would be less efficient
> and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
> 
> In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is
> useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature
> verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>

Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>

> ---
>  Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  fs/ext4/ioctl.c                        |  7 ++++
>  fs/f2fs/file.c                         | 11 +++++
>  fs/verity/Makefile                     |  1 +
>  fs/verity/read_metadata.c              | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/fsverity.h               | 12 ++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h          | 10 +++++
>  7 files changed, 153 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 fs/verity/read_metadata.c
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> index e0204a23e997e..9ef7a7de60085 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> @@ -217,6 +217,63 @@ FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
>  - ``EOVERFLOW``: the digest is longer than the specified
>    ``digest_size`` bytes.  Try providing a larger buffer.
>  
> +FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA
> +---------------------------
> +
> +The FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl reads verity metadata from a
> +verity file.  This ioctl is available since Linux v5.12.
> +
> +This ioctl allows writing a server program that takes a verity file
> +and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own
> +fs-verity compatible verification of the file.  This only makes sense
> +if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to
> +provide the storage for the client.
> +
> +This is a fairly specialized use case, and most fs-verity users won't
> +need this ioctl.
> +
> +This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure::
> +
> +   struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {
> +           __u64 metadata_type;
> +           __u64 offset;
> +           __u64 length;
> +           __u64 buf_ptr;
> +           __u64 __reserved;
> +   };
> +
> +``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read.
> +
> +The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``.  ``offset``
> +specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and
> +``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the
> +metadata item.  ``buf_ptr`` is the pointer to the buffer to read into,
> +cast to a 64-bit integer.  ``__reserved`` must be 0.  On success, the
> +number of bytes read is returned.  0 is returned at the end of the
> +metadata item.  The returned length may be less than ``length``, for
> +example if the ioctl is interrupted.
> +
> +The metadata returned by FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA isn't guaranteed
> +to be authenticated against the file digest that would be returned by
> +`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_, as the metadata is expected to be used to
> +implement fs-verity compatible verification anyway (though absent a
> +malicious disk, the metadata will indeed match).  E.g. to implement
> +this ioctl, the filesystem is allowed to just read the Merkle tree
> +blocks from disk without actually verifying the path to the root node.
> +
> +FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors:
> +
> +- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
> +- ``EINTR``: the ioctl was interrupted before any data was read
> +- ``EINVAL``: reserved fields were set, or ``offset + length``
> +  overflowed
> +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file
> +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity, or
> +  this ioctl is not yet implemented on it
> +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
> +  support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity'
> +  feature enabled on it.  (See `Filesystem support`_.)
> +
>  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
>  ---------------
>  
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
> index 524e134324475..56dc58adba8ac 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
> @@ -1306,6 +1306,12 @@ static long __ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>  			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  		return fsverity_ioctl_measure(filp, (void __user *)arg);
>  
> +	case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA:
> +		if (!ext4_has_feature_verity(sb))
> +			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +		return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(filp,
> +						    (const void __user *)arg);
> +
>  	default:
>  		return -ENOTTY;
>  	}
> @@ -1388,6 +1394,7 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>  	case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP:
>  	case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
>  	case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
> +	case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA:
>  	case EXT4_IOC_CLEAR_ES_CACHE:
>  	case EXT4_IOC_GETSTATE:
>  	case EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE:
> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
> index f585545277d77..d0aefb5b97fac 100644
> --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
> +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
> @@ -3357,6 +3357,14 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
>  	return fsverity_ioctl_measure(filp, (void __user *)arg);
>  }
>  
> +static int f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> +	if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp))))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +	return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(filp, (const void __user *)arg);
> +}
> +
>  static int f2fs_ioc_getfslabel(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
>  {
>  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
> @@ -4272,6 +4280,8 @@ static long __f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>  		return f2fs_ioc_enable_verity(filp, arg);
>  	case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
>  		return f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(filp, arg);
> +	case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA:
> +		return f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata(filp, arg);
>  	case FS_IOC_GETFSLABEL:
>  		return f2fs_ioc_getfslabel(filp, arg);
>  	case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL:
> @@ -4523,6 +4533,7 @@ long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
>  	case F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS:
>  	case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
>  	case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
> +	case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA:
>  	case FS_IOC_GETFSLABEL:
>  	case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL:
>  	case F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS:
> diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile
> index 570e9136334d4..435559a4fa9ea 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/Makefile
> +++ b/fs/verity/Makefile
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \
>  			   init.o \
>  			   measure.o \
>  			   open.o \
> +			   read_metadata.o \
>  			   verify.o
>  
>  obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) += signature.o
> diff --git a/fs/verity/read_metadata.c b/fs/verity/read_metadata.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..43be990fd53e4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/read_metadata.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Ioctl to read verity metadata
> + *
> + * Copyright 2021 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#include "fsverity_private.h"
> +
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file
> + * @filp: file to read the metadata from
> + * @uarg: user pointer to fsverity_read_metadata_arg
> + *
> + * Return: length read on success, 0 on EOF, -errno on failure
> + */
> +int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
> +{
> +	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
> +	const struct fsverity_info *vi;
> +	struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg arg;
> +	int length;
> +	void __user *buf;
> +
> +	vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
> +	if (!vi)
> +		return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
> +	/*
> +	 * Note that we don't have to explicitly check that the file is open for
> +	 * reading, since verity files can only be opened for reading.
> +	 */
> +
> +	if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (arg.__reserved)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/* offset + length must not overflow. */
> +	if (arg.offset + arg.length < arg.offset)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/* Ensure that the return value will fit in INT_MAX. */
> +	length = min_t(u64, arg.length, INT_MAX);
> +
> +	buf = u64_to_user_ptr(arg.buf_ptr);
> +
> +	switch (arg.metadata_type) {
> +	default:
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata);
> diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h
> index c1144a4503920..b568b3c7d095e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h
> @@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
>  int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
>  void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
>  
> +/* read_metadata.c */
> +
> +int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg);
> +
>  /* verify.c */
>  
>  bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page);
> @@ -183,6 +187,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
>  {
>  }
>  
> +/* read_metadata.c */
> +
> +static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp,
> +					       const void __user *uarg)
> +{
> +	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +}
> +
>  /* verify.c */
>  
>  static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h b/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h
> index 33f44156f8ea5..e062751294d01 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h
> @@ -83,7 +83,17 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest {
>  	__u8 digest[];
>  };
>  
> +struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {
> +	__u64 metadata_type;
> +	__u64 offset;
> +	__u64 length;
> +	__u64 buf_ptr;
> +	__u64 __reserved;
> +};
> +
>  #define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY	_IOW('f', 133, struct fsverity_enable_arg)
>  #define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY	_IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest)
> +#define FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA \
> +	_IOWR('f', 135, struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg)
>  
>  #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */
> -- 
> 2.30.0

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