linux-ext4 - [PATCH v7 4/8] ext4: Reuse generic_ci

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Message-Id: <20220519204645.16528-5-krisman@collabora.com>
Date:   Thu, 19 May 2022 16:46:41 -0400
From:   Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>
To:     tytso@....edu, adilger.kernel@...ger.ca, jaegeuk@...nel.org,
        ebiggers@...nel.org
Cc:     linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>,
        kernel@...labora.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 4/8] ext4: Reuse generic_ci_match for ci comparisons

Instead of reimplementing ext4_match_ci, use the new libfs helper.

It also adds a comment explaining why fname->cf_name.name must be
checked prior to the encryption hash optimization, because that tripped
me before.

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>

---
Changes since v6:
  - Readd cf_name != NULL on hash verification and comment explaining it (eric)
---
 fs/ext4/namei.c | 91 +++++++++++++++----------------------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 206fcf8fdc16..5e68dd6ad9b8 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1318,58 +1318,6 @@ static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block)
 }
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
-/*
- * Test whether a case-insensitive directory entry matches the filename
- * being searched for.  If quick is set, assume the name being looked up
- * is already in the casefolded form.
- *
- * Returns: 0 if the directory entry matches, more than 0 if it
- * doesn't match or less than zero on error.
- */
-static int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *name,
-			   u8 *de_name, size_t de_name_len, bool quick)
-{
-	const struct super_block *sb = parent->i_sb;
-	const struct unicode_map *um = sb->s_encoding;
-	struct fscrypt_str decrypted_name = FSTR_INIT(NULL, de_name_len);
-	struct qstr entry = QSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len);
-	int ret;
-
-	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) {
-		const struct fscrypt_str encrypted_name =
-				FSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len);
-
-		decrypted_name.name = kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!decrypted_name.name)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		ret = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(parent, 0, 0, &encrypted_name,
-						&decrypted_name);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto out;
-		entry.name = decrypted_name.name;
-		entry.len = decrypted_name.len;
-	}
-
-	if (quick)
-		ret = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, &entry);
-	else
-		ret = utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, &entry);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		/* Handle invalid character sequence as either an error
-		 * or as an opaque byte sequence.
-		 */
-		if (sb_has_strict_encoding(sb))
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-		else if (name->len != entry.len)
-			ret = 1;
-		else
-			ret = !!memcmp(name->name, entry.name, entry.len);
-	}
-out:
-	kfree(decrypted_name.name);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
 				  struct ext4_filename *name)
 {
@@ -1432,20 +1380,35 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent,
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE)
 	if (parent->i_sb->s_encoding && IS_CASEFOLDED(parent) &&
 	    (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) || fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent))) {
-		if (fname->cf_name.name) {
-			if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) {
-				if (fname->hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) ||
-					fname->hinfo.minor_hash !=
-						EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) {
+		int ret;
 
-					return false;
-				}
-			}
-			return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &fname->cf_name,
-						de->name, de->name_len, true);
+		/*
+		 * Just checking IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) below is not
+		 * sufficient to decide whether one can use the hash for
+		 * skipping the string comparison, because the key might
+		 * have been added right after
+		 * ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename().  In this case, a hash
+		 * mismatch will be a false negative.  Therefore, make
+		 * sure cf_name was properly initialized before
+		 * considering the calculated hash.
+		 */
+		if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) && fname->cf_name.name
+		    (fname->hinfo.hash != EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) ||
+		     fname->hinfo.minor_hash != EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)))
+			return false;
+
+		ret = generic_ci_match(parent, fname->usr_fname,
+				       &fname->cf_name, de->name,
+				       de->name_len);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Treat comparison errors as not a match.  The
+			 * only case where it happens is on a disk
+			 * corruption or ENOMEM.
+			 */
+			return false;
 		}
-		return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, de->name,
-						de->name_len, false);
+		return ret;
 	}
 #endif
 
-- 
2.36.1