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Message-ID: <Y5zbNtaadNGPGHQb@sol.localdomain> Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 12:55:18 -0800 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> To: Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org> Cc: linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, Jes Sorensen <jsorensen@...a.com>, Victor Hsieh <victorhsieh@...gle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] fsverity: mark builtin signatures as deprecated On Thu, Dec 08, 2022 at 09:37:29PM +0000, Luca Boccassi wrote: > > The second question is easy: because the kernel is the right place for > our use case to do this verification and enforcement, exactly like dm- > verity does. Well, dm-verity's in-kernel signature verification support is a fairly new feature. Most users of dm-verity don't use it, and will not be using it. > Userspace is largely untrusted, or much lower trust anyway. Yes, which means the kernel is highly trusted. Which is why parsing complex binary formats, X.509 and PKCS#7, in C code in the kernel is not a great idea... - Eric
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