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Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 19:04:28 +0300
From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
"Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@...nel.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
lvc-project@...uxtesting.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()
strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term
string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce
memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that
regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed:
strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039
strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline]
sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline]
parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline]
__ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline]
ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636
vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline]
path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63
characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer
which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job
properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a
non-NUL-term string here.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>
---
v2: - treat non-NUL-term s_mount_opts as invalid case (Jan Kara)
- swap order of patches in series so the fixing-one goes first
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251028130949.599847-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru/T/#u
fs/ext4/super.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
index 33e7c08c9529..15bef41f08bd 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
@@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
- char s_mount_opts[65];
+ char s_mount_opts[64];
struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL;
struct fs_context *fc = NULL;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -2483,7 +2483,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb,
if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0])
return 0;
- strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
+ if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0)
+ return -E2BIG;
fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fc)
--
2.51.0
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