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Message-ID: <rczp7azxizqhn5677vk6mpbrglu4khlrj5yfiq6fuoewdj6wqz@ryux7tf7g4mj>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 12:38:56 +0100
From: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
To: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
"Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lvc-project@...uxtesting.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] ext4: fix string copying in
parse_apply_sb_mount_options()
On Sat 01-11-25 19:04:28, Fedor Pchelkin wrote:
> strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term
> string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce
> memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that
> regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed:
>
> strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64
> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
> RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039
> strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline]
> sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline]
> parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline]
> __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline]
> ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706
> get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636
> vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814
> do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline]
> path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880
> do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline]
> __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline]
> __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline]
> __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
>
> Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63
> characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer
> which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job
> properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a
> non-NUL-term string here.
>
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
>
> Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@...ras.ru>
Looks good. Feel free to add:
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Honza
> ---
>
> v2: - treat non-NUL-term s_mount_opts as invalid case (Jan Kara)
> - swap order of patches in series so the fixing-one goes first
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20251028130949.599847-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru/T/#u
>
> fs/ext4/super.c | 5 +++--
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c
> index 33e7c08c9529..15bef41f08bd 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/super.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
> @@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb,
> struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx)
> {
> struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
> - char s_mount_opts[65];
> + char s_mount_opts[64];
> struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL;
> struct fs_context *fc = NULL;
> int ret = -ENOMEM;
> @@ -2483,7 +2483,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb,
> if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0])
> return 0;
>
> - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts);
> + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0)
> + return -E2BIG;
>
> fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!fc)
> --
> 2.51.0
>
--
Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>
SUSE Labs, CR
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