linux-hardening - Re: [PATCH RESEND v2] mm: Optional full ASLR for mmap() and mremap()

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Date:   Thu, 8 Oct 2020 19:13:51 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2] mm: Optional full ASLR for mmap() and mremap()

On Thu, Oct 8, 2020 at 6:54 PM Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com> wrote:
> Writing a new value of 3 to /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
> enables full randomization of memory mappings created with mmap(NULL,
> ...). With 2, the base of the VMA used for such mappings is random,
> but the mappings are created in predictable places within the VMA and
> in sequential order. With 3, new VMAs are created to fully randomize
> the mappings. Also mremap(..., MREMAP_MAYMOVE) will move the mappings
> even if not necessary.
[...]
> +       if ((flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) && randomize_va_space >= 3) {
> +               /*
> +                * Caller is happy with a different address, so let's
> +                * move even if not necessary!
> +                */
> +               new_addr = arch_mmap_rnd();
> +
> +               ret = mremap_to(addr, old_len, new_addr, new_len,
> +                               &locked, flags, &uf, &uf_unmap_early,
> +                               &uf_unmap);
> +               goto out;
> +       }

You just pick a random number as the address, and try to place the
mapping there? Won't this fail if e.g. the old address range overlaps
with the new one, causing mremap_to() to bail out at "if (addr +
old_len > new_addr && new_addr + new_len > addr)"?

Also, on Linux, the main program stack is (currently) an expanding
memory mapping that starts out being something like a couple hundred
kilobytes in size. If you allocate memory too close to the main
program stack, and someone then recurses deep enough to need more
memory, the program will crash. It sounds like your patch will
randomly make such programs crash.

Also, what's your strategy in general with regards to collisions with
existing mappings? Is your intention to just fall back to the classic
algorithm in that case?

You may want to consider whether it would be better to store
information about free memory per subtree in the VMA tree, together
with the maximum gap size that is already stored in each node, and
then walk down the tree randomly, with the randomness weighted by free
memory in the subtrees, but ignoring subtrees whose gaps are too
small. And for expanding stacks, it might be a good idea for other
reasons as well (locking consistency) to refactor them such that the
size in the VMA tree corresponds to the maximum expansion of the stack
(and if an allocation is about to fail, shrink such stack mappings).