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Message-ID: <20201203065801.GH751215@kernel.org> Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 08:58:01 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org> To: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com> Cc: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations On Wed, Dec 02, 2020 at 08:49:06PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote: > On 1.12.2020 23.45, Topi Miettinen wrote: > > Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in > > predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses. With > > new kernel boot parameter 'randomize_vmalloc=1', the entire area is > > used randomly to make the allocations less predictable and harder to > > guess for attackers. > > > > This also seems to randomize module addresses. I was going to check that > next, so nice surprise! Heh, that's because module_alloc() uses vmalloc() in that way or another :) > -Topi > > > spin_unlock(&free_vmap_area_lock); > > if (unlikely(addr == vend)) > > > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.
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