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Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 13:24:10 +0100
From: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>
To: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 11:04:42AM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> On 14.3.2021 19.23, Uladzislau Rezki wrote:
> > > Memory mappings inside kernel allocated with vmalloc() are in
> > > predictable order and packed tightly toward the low addresses, except
> > > for per-cpu areas which start from top of the vmalloc area. With
> > > new kernel boot parameter 'randomize_vmalloc=1', the entire area is
> > > used randomly to make the allocations less predictable and harder to
> > > guess for attackers. Also module and BPF code locations get randomized
> > > (within their dedicated and rather small area though) and if
> > > CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, also kernel thread stack locations.
> > >
> > > On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due to increased VM
> > > fragmentation if the address space gets crowded.
> > >
> > > On all systems, it will reduce performance and increase memory and
> > > cache usage due to less efficient use of page tables and inability to
> > > merge adjacent VMAs with compatible attributes. On x86_64 with 5 level
> > > page tables, in the worst case, additional page table entries of up to
> > > 4 pages are created for each mapping, so with small mappings there's
> > > considerable penalty.
> > >
> > > Without randomize_vmalloc=1:
> > > $ grep -v kernel_clone /proc/vmallocinfo
> > > 0xffffc90000000000-0xffffc90000009000 36864 irq_init_percpu_irqstack+0x176/0x1c0 vmap
> > > 0xffffc90000009000-0xffffc9000000b000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x2ac/0x2d0 phys=0x000000001ffe1000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffc9000000c000-0xffffc9000000f000 12288 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x2ac/0x2d0 phys=0x000000001ffe0000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffc9000000f000-0xffffc90000011000 8192 hpet_enable+0x31/0x4a4 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffc90000011000-0xffffc90000013000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000013000-0xffffc90000015000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000015000-0xffffc90000017000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000021000-0xffffc90000023000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000023000-0xffffc90000025000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x2ac/0x2d0 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffc90000025000-0xffffc90000027000 8192 memremap+0x19c/0x280 phys=0x00000000000f5000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffc90000031000-0xffffc90000036000 20480 pcpu_create_chunk+0xe8/0x260 pages=4 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000043000-0xffffc90000047000 16384 n_tty_open+0x11/0xe0 pages=3 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000211000-0xffffc90000232000 135168 crypto_scomp_init_tfm+0xc6/0xf0 pages=32 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc90000232000-0xffffc90000253000 135168 crypto_scomp_init_tfm+0x67/0xf0 pages=32 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc900005a9000-0xffffc900005ba000 69632 pcpu_create_chunk+0x7b/0x260 pages=16 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffc900005ba000-0xffffc900005cc000 73728 pcpu_create_chunk+0xb2/0x260 pages=17 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffe8ffffc00000-0xffffe8ffffe00000 2097152 pcpu_get_vm_areas+0x0/0x2290 vmalloc
> > >
> > > With randomize_vmalloc=1, the allocations are randomized:
> > > $ grep -v kernel_clone /proc/vmallocinfo
> > > 0xffffc9759d443000-0xffffc9759d445000 8192 hpet_enable+0x31/0x4a4 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffccf1e9f66000-0xffffccf1e9f68000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffcd2fc02a4000-0xffffcd2fc02a6000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffcdaefb898000-0xffffcdaefb89b000 12288 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x2ac/0x2d0 phys=0x000000001ffe0000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffcef8074c3000-0xffffcef8074cc000 36864 irq_init_percpu_irqstack+0x176/0x1c0 vmap
> > > 0xffffcf725ca2e000-0xffffcf725ca4f000 135168 crypto_scomp_init_tfm+0xc6/0xf0 pages=32 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffd0efb25e1000-0xffffd0efb25f2000 69632 pcpu_create_chunk+0x7b/0x260 pages=16 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffd27054678000-0xffffd2705467c000 16384 n_tty_open+0x11/0xe0 pages=3 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffd2adf716e000-0xffffd2adf7180000 73728 pcpu_create_chunk+0xb2/0x260 pages=17 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffd4ba5fb6b000-0xffffd4ba5fb6d000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x2ac/0x2d0 phys=0x000000001ffe1000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffded126192000-0xffffded126194000 8192 memremap+0x19c/0x280 phys=0x00000000000f5000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffe01a4dbcd000-0xffffe01a4dbcf000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffe4b649952000-0xffffe4b649954000 8192 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x2ac/0x2d0 phys=0x00000000fed00000 ioremap
> > > 0xffffe71ed592a000-0xffffe71ed592c000 8192 gen_pool_add_owner+0x49/0x130 pages=1 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffe7dc5824f000-0xffffe7dc58270000 135168 crypto_scomp_init_tfm+0x67/0xf0 pages=32 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffe8f4f9800000-0xffffe8f4f9a00000 2097152 pcpu_get_vm_areas+0x0/0x2290 vmalloc
> > > 0xffffe8f4f9a19000-0xffffe8f4f9a1e000 20480 pcpu_create_chunk+0xe8/0x260 pages=4 vmalloc
> > >
> > > With CONFIG_VMAP_STACK, also kernel thread stacks are placed in
> > > vmalloc area and therefore they also get randomized (only one example
> > > line from /proc/vmallocinfo shown for brevity):
> > >
> > > unrandomized:
> > > 0xffffc90000018000-0xffffc90000021000 36864 kernel_clone+0xf9/0x560 pages=8 vmalloc
> > >
> > > randomized:
> > > 0xffffcb57611a8000-0xffffcb57611b1000 36864 kernel_clone+0xf9/0x560 pages=8 vmalloc
> > >
> > > CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> > > CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> > > CC: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> > > CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > > CC: Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
> > > CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
> > > CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
> > > CC: Vlad Rezki <urezki@...il.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
> > > ---
> > > v2: retry allocation from other end of vmalloc space in case of
> > > failure (Matthew Wilcox), improve commit message and documentation
> > > v3: randomize also percpu allocations (pcpu_get_vm_areas())
> > > v4: use static branches (Kees Cook) and make the parameter boolean.
> > > ---
> > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 24 ++++++++++
> > > mm/vmalloc.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++--
> > > 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > > index a10b545c2070..726aec542079 100644
> > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > > @@ -4024,6 +4024,30 @@
> > > ramdisk_start= [RAM] RAM disk image start address
> > > + randomize_vmalloc= [KNL] Boolean option to randomize vmalloc()
> > > + allocations. When enabled, the entire
> > > + vmalloc() area is used randomly to make the
> > > + allocations less predictable and harder to
> > > + guess for attackers. Also module and BPF code
> > > + locations get randomized (within their
> > > + dedicated and rather small area though) and if
> > > + CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, also kernel
> > > + thread stack locations.
> > > +
> > > + On 32 bit systems this may cause problems due
> > > + to increased VM fragmentation if the address
> > > + space gets crowded.
> > >
> > What kind of problems? Could you please more cpecific? I guess fail
> > ratio will be increased.
>
> Maybe it would be simplest to disable the option entirely for 32 bit
> architectures. I think if such a system has lots of RAM (maybe 4GB?), so
> that the kernel VM area (1GB?) can be fully utilized, it's possible that
> when the area is allocated randomly, the gaps between allocations can become
> unusable for further allocations. Perhaps the option could still work with a
> system on the low end (64MB?) because any allocations (for example page
> tables needed) consume real RAM so the fragmentation does not become the
> bottleneck.
>
Probably it make sense to disable it for 32-bit system. I suspect that
due to such randomization a fail ratio will be increased and vmalloc()
will start failing a lot.
> >
> > > +
> > > + On all systems, it will reduce performance and
> > > + increase memory and cache usage due to less
> > > + efficient use of page tables and inability to
> > > + merge adjacent VMAs with compatible
> > > + attributes. On x86_64 with 5 level page
> > > + tables, in the worst case, additional page
> > > + table entries of up to 4 pages are created for
> > > + each mapping, so with small mappings there's
> > > + considerable penalty.
> > Could you please put test results to the commit message? You can run
> > "test_vmalloc.sh performance" on you system. It will give us some
> > figures to understand the performance difference.
>
> Thanks, I didn't notice this tool.
>
You are welcome :)
> >
> > > +
> > > random.trust_cpu={on,off}
> > > [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the
> > > CPU's random number generator (if available) to
> > > diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
> > > index e6f352bf0498..b5ecf27dc98e 100644
> > > --- a/mm/vmalloc.c
> > > +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
> > > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> > > #include <linux/bitops.h>
> > > #include <linux/rbtree_augmented.h>
> > > #include <linux/overflow.h>
> > > +#include <linux/random.h>
> > > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > > #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
> > > @@ -1089,6 +1090,25 @@ adjust_va_to_fit_type(struct vmap_area *va,
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > > +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(randomize_vmalloc);
> > > +
> > > +static int __init set_randomize_vmalloc(char *str)
> > > +{
> > > + int ret;
> > > + bool bool_result;
> > > +
> > > + ret = kstrtobool(str, &bool_result);
> > > + if (ret)
> > > + return ret;
> > > +
> > > + if (bool_result)
> > > + static_branch_enable(&randomize_vmalloc);
> > > + else
> > > + static_branch_disable(&randomize_vmalloc);
> > > + return 1;
> > > +}
> > > +__setup("randomize_vmalloc=", set_randomize_vmalloc);
> > > +
> > > /*
> > > * Returns a start address of the newly allocated area, if success.
> > > * Otherwise a vend is returned that indicates failure.
> > > @@ -1162,7 +1182,7 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size,
> > > int node, gfp_t gfp_mask)
> > > {
> > > struct vmap_area *va, *pva;
> > > - unsigned long addr;
> > > + unsigned long addr, voffset;
> > > int purged = 0;
> > > int ret;
> > > @@ -1217,11 +1237,24 @@ static struct vmap_area *alloc_vmap_area(unsigned long size,
> > > if (pva && __this_cpu_cmpxchg(ne_fit_preload_node, NULL, pva))
> > > kmem_cache_free(vmap_area_cachep, pva);
> > > + /* Randomize allocation */
> > > + if (static_branch_unlikely(&randomize_vmalloc)) {
> > > + voffset = get_random_long() & (roundup_pow_of_two(vend - vstart) - 1);
> > > + voffset = PAGE_ALIGN(voffset);
> > > + if (voffset + size > vend - vstart)
> > > + voffset = vend - vstart - size;
> > > + } else
> > > + voffset = 0;
> > > +
> > Could you please wrap that change into a separate function? For example
> > randomize_voffset_with_range(start, end).
>
> OK. I'm relying on compiler noticing that voffset is zero (in some cases)
> and then it can skip the addition. Maybe the addition could be avoided
> entirely.
>
It is just better to place it into separate function to make the code
less clogged. Also, it should be called outside of the lock. There is
no need to calculate and offset under holding free_vmap_area_lock.
> >
> > > /*
> > > * If an allocation fails, the "vend" address is
> > > * returned. Therefore trigger the overflow path.
> > > */
> > > - addr = __alloc_vmap_area(size, align, vstart, vend);
> > > + addr = __alloc_vmap_area(size, align, vstart + voffset, vend);
> > > +
> > > + if (unlikely(addr == vend) && voffset)
> > > + /* Retry randomization from other end */
> > > + addr = __alloc_vmap_area(size, align, vstart, vstart + voffset + size);
> > > spin_unlock(&free_vmap_area_lock);
> > > if (unlikely(addr == vend))
> > > @@ -3258,7 +3291,12 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets,
> > > start = offsets[area];
> > > end = start + sizes[area];
> > > - va = pvm_find_va_enclose_addr(vmalloc_end);
> > > + if (static_branch_unlikely(&randomize_vmalloc))
> > > + va = pvm_find_va_enclose_addr(vmalloc_start +
> > > + (get_random_long() &
> > > + (roundup_pow_of_two(vmalloc_end - vmalloc_start) - 1)));
> > > + else
> > > + va = pvm_find_va_enclose_addr(vmalloc_end);
> > > base = pvm_determine_end_from_reverse(&va, align) - end;
> > As for per-cpu embedded alloator. Even though currently it is part of
> > the vmalloc space, it is not a vmalloc() allocation. Please do not change
> > its code. It does alloations by "chunks" where an internal structure
> > represent special memory layout that is used for actual allocations.
>
> What's the problem with that? It seems to me that nothing relies on specific
> addresses of the chunks, so it should be possible to randomize these too.
> Also the alignment is honored.
>
My concern are:
- it is not a vmalloc allocator;
- per-cpu allocator allocates chunks, thus it might be it happens only once. It does not allocate it often;
- changing it will likely introduce issues you are not aware of;
- it is not supposed to be interacting with vmalloc allocator. Read the
comment under pcpu_get_vm_areas();
Therefore i propose just not touch it.
> >
> >
> > Also, using vmaloc test driver i can trigger a kernel BUG:
> >
> > <snip>
> > [ 24.627577] kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:1272!
> > [ 24.628645] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
> > [ 24.628684] CPU: 30 PID: 929 Comm: vmalloc_test/0 Tainted: G E 5.11.0-next-20210225-next #484
> > [ 24.628724] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
> > [ 24.628757] RIP: 0010:alloc_vmap_area.isra.53+0x593/0xf10
> > [ 24.628784] Code: 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 0f 0b 0f 0b 48 c7 44 24 10 f0 ff ff ff eb c9 48 8d 5a f0 e9 9c fc ff ff 48 c7 44 24 10 f4 ff ff ff eb b5 <0f> 0b 4c 8d 4b 10 48 39 d0 74 12 48 8b 44 24 18 31 ff 48 89 03 48
> > [ 24.628853] RSP: 0018:ffffc4296cf67d38 EFLAGS: 00010206
> > [ 24.628876] RAX: ffffd6db9e61a000 RBX: ffff8ae9c9309440 RCX: 0000000000000001
> > [ 24.628905] RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: ffff8ae9c0046be8 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
> > [ 24.628933] RBP: 0000000000002000 R08: ffff8ae9c13699e8 R09: ffffb98000000000
> > [ 24.628961] R10: ffffd6db9e61a000 R11: 000000003aa1c801 R12: ffff8ae9c9f0d280
> > [ 24.628989] R13: 0000008000001fff R14: ffffff8000000000 R15: 0000007fffffffff
> > [ 24.629019] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8af8bf580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > [ 24.629051] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > [ 24.629074] CR2: 000055916370aa80 CR3: 00000006bf40a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> > [ 24.629103] Call Trace:
> > [ 24.629128] ? map_kernel_range_noflush+0x27a/0x360
> > [ 24.629150] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x340/0x460
> > [ 24.629172] __get_vm_area_node.isra.54+0xa7/0x150
> > [ 24.629195] ? fix_size_alloc_test+0x50/0x50 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629221] __vmalloc_node_range+0x64/0x230
> > [ 24.629241] ? test_func+0xdb/0x1f0 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629263] ? fix_size_alloc_test+0x50/0x50 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629288] __vmalloc_node+0x3b/0x40
> > [ 24.629305] ? test_func+0xdb/0x1f0 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629326] align_shift_alloc_test+0x39/0x50 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629350] test_func+0xdb/0x1f0 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629372] ? fix_align_alloc_test+0x50/0x50 [test_vmalloc]
> > [ 24.629396] kthread+0x13d/0x160
> > [ 24.629413] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
> > [ 24.629431] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> > <snip>
> >
> > --
> > Vlad Rezki
> >
>
> Hopefully I can also reproduce this with test driver. Thanks for testing!
>
I think you will manage to reproduce it.
--
Vlad Rezki
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