lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Wed, 7 Apr 2021 22:35:03 +0100
From:   Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 04:23:46PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
> 5 bits of entropy. (And include AAPCS rationale AAPCS thanks to Mark
> Rutland.)
> 
> In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
> the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
> needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
> way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute[1],
> this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. This isn't a problem
> here, though, since stack protector was not triggered before: examining
> the resulting syscall.o, there are no changes in canary coverage (none
> before, none now).
> 
> [1] a working __attribute__((no_stack_protector)) has been added to GCC
> and Clang but has not been released in any version yet:
> https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=346b302d09c1e6db56d9fe69048acb32fbb97845
> https://reviews.llvm.org/rG4fbf84c1732fca596ad1d6e96015e19760eb8a9b
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/Kconfig          |  1 +
>  arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile  |  5 +++++
>  arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>

Will

Powered by blists - more mailing lists