[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20211013150025.2875883-1-arnd@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 17:00:05 +0200
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...nel.org>
To: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...mium.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Patricia Alfonso <trishalfonso@...gle.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] kasan: test: use underlying string helpers
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Calling memcmp() and memchr() with an intentional buffer overflow
is now caught at compile time:
In function 'memcmp',
inlined from 'kasan_memcmp' at lib/test_kasan.c:897:2:
include/linux/fortify-string.h:263:25: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
263 | __read_overflow();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In function 'memchr',
inlined from 'kasan_memchr' at lib/test_kasan.c:872:2:
include/linux/fortify-string.h:277:17: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
277 | __read_overflow();
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Change the kasan tests to wrap those inside of a noinline function
to prevent the compiler from noticing the bug and let kasan find
it at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
---
lib/test_kasan.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 67ed689a0b1b..903215e944f1 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -852,6 +852,21 @@ static void kmem_cache_invalid_free(struct kunit *test)
kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
}
+/*
+ * noinline wrappers to prevent the compiler from noticing the overflow
+ * at compile time rather than having kasan catch it.
+ * */
+static noinline void *__kasan_memchr(const void *s, int c, size_t n)
+{
+ return memchr(s, c, n);
+}
+
+static noinline int __kasan_memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n)
+{
+ return memcmp(s1, s2, n);
+}
+
+
static void kasan_memchr(struct kunit *test)
{
char *ptr;
@@ -870,7 +885,7 @@ static void kasan_memchr(struct kunit *test)
KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
- kasan_ptr_result = memchr(ptr, '1', size + 1));
+ kasan_ptr_result = __kasan_memchr(ptr, '1', size + 1));
kfree(ptr);
}
@@ -895,7 +910,7 @@ static void kasan_memcmp(struct kunit *test)
memset(arr, 0, sizeof(arr));
KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test,
- kasan_int_result = memcmp(ptr, arr, size+1));
+ kasan_int_result = __kasan_memcmp(ptr, arr, size+1));
kfree(ptr);
}
--
2.29.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists