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Message-Id: <20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:09:47 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Ariadne Conill <ariadne@...eferenced.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty
Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill:
"In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the
second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting
a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour,
but it is not an explicit requirement[2]:
The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is
associated with the process being started by one of the exec
functions.
...
Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3],
but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then.
Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4]
of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider.
This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]."
While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be
mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL
(or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8]
existing userspace programs.
The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and
adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0
seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv.
Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an
empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so
userspace has some notice about the change:
process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added
Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org/
[2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html
[3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408
[4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt
[5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176
[6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0
[7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C%5Cs*NULL&literal=0
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Reported-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@...eferenced.org>
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 79f2c9483302..bbf3aadf7ce1 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -495,8 +495,14 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't
* signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space.
* Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully.
+ *
+ * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a
+ * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused
+ * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking
+ * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident.
+ * See do_execveat_common().
*/
- ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+ ptr_size = (min(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
if (limit <= ptr_size)
return -E2BIG;
limit -= ptr_size;
@@ -1897,6 +1903,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
}
retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
+ if (retval == 0)
+ pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n",
+ current->comm, bprm->filename);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
bprm->argc = retval;
@@ -1923,6 +1932,19 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
+ /*
+ * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to
+ * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing
+ * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also
+ * bprm_stack_limits().
+ */
+ if (bprm->argc == 0) {
+ retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out_free;
+ bprm->argc = 1;
+ }
+
retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags);
out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1951,6 +1973,8 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename,
}
retval = count_strings_kernel(argv);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0))
+ retval = -EINVAL;
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
bprm->argc = retval;
--
2.30.2
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