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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 01:57:36 -0800 From: Dan Li <ashimida@...ux.alibaba.com> To: catalin.marinas@....com, will@...nel.org, nathan@...nel.org, ndesaulniers@...gle.com, keescook@...omium.org, masahiroy@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, mark.rutland@....com, samitolvanen@...gle.com, npiggin@...il.com, linux@...ck-us.net, mhiramat@...nel.org, ojeda@...nel.org, luc.vanoostenryck@...il.com, elver@...gle.com Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, Dan Li <ashimida@...ux.alibaba.com> Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] AARCH64: Add gcc Shadow Call Stack support Shadow call stack is available in GCC > 11.2.0, this patch makes the corresponding kernel configuration available when compiling the kernel with gcc. Note that the implementation in GCC is slightly different from Clang. With SCS enabled, functions will only pop x30 once in the epilogue, like: str x30, [x18], #8 stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ...... - ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 //clang + ldr x29, [sp], #16 //GCC ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=ce09ab17ddd21f73ff2caf6eec3b0ee9b0e1a11e Signed-off-by: Dan Li <ashimida@...ux.alibaba.com> --- FYI: This function can be used to test if the shadow call stack works: //noinline void __noscs scs_test(void) noinline void scs_test(void) { register unsigned long *sp asm("sp"); unsigned long * lr = sp + 1; asm volatile("":::"x30"); *lr = 0; } ffff800008012704: d503233f paciasp ffff800008012708: f800865e str x30, [x18], #8 ffff80000801270c: a9bf7bfd stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! ffff800008012710: 910003fd mov x29, sp ffff800008012714: 910003e0 mov x0, sp ffff800008012718: f900041f str xzr, [x0, #8] ffff80000801271c: f85f8e5e ldr x30, [x18, #-8]! ffff800008012720: f84107fd ldr x29, [sp], #16 ffff800008012724: d50323bf autiasp ffff800008012728: d65f03c0 ret If SCS protection is enabled, this function will return normally. If the function has __noscs attribute (scs disabled), it will crash due to 0 address access. arch/Kconfig | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 678a80713b21..35db7b72bdb0 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -604,11 +604,11 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK switching. config SHADOW_CALL_STACK - bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack" - depends on CC_IS_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK + bool "Shadow Call Stack" + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER help - This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a + This option enables Clang/GCC's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found in Clang's documentation: diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 09b885cc4db5..a48a604301aa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ config HW_PERF_EVENTS config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT def_bool y -# Supported by clang >= 7.0 +# Supported by clang >= 7.0 or GCC > 11.2.0 config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18) diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h index ccbbd31b3aae..deff5b308470 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h @@ -97,6 +97,10 @@ #define KASAN_ABI_VERSION 4 #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK +#define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack"))) +#endif + #if __has_attribute(__no_sanitize_address__) #define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((no_sanitize_address)) #else -- 2.17.1
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