linux-hardening - Re: [PATCH -next] powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization

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Date:   Wed, 11 May 2022 16:36:47 +0800
From:   xiujianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>
CC:     <benh@...nel.crashing.org>, <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
        <mark.rutland@....com>, <mpe@...erman.id.au>, <paulus@...ba.org>,
        <tglx@...utronix.de>, <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next] powerpc: add support for syscall stack
 randomization


在 2022/5/11 0:19, Kees Cook 写道:
> On Tue, May 10, 2022 at 07:23:46PM +1000, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
>> Excerpts from Xiu Jianfeng's message of May 5, 2022 9:19 pm:
>>> Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling
>>> syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better
>>> performance.
>> Hey, very nice.
> Agreed! :)
>
>>> [...]
>>> @@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5,
>>>   
>>>   	kuap_lock();
>>>   
>>> +	add_random_kstack_offset();
>>>   	regs->orig_gpr3 = r3;
>>>   
>>>   	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG))
>> This looks like the right place. I wonder why other interrupts don't
>> get the same treatment. Userspace can induce the kernel to take a
>> synchronous interrupt, or wait for async ones. Smaller surface area
>> maybe but certain instruction emulation for example could result in
>> significant logic that depends on user state. Anyway that's for
>> hardening gurus to ponder.
> I welcome it being used for any userspace controllable entry to the
> kernel! :)
>
> Also, related, have you validated the result using the LKDTM test?
> See tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh

not yet, I tested it by printing the address of local variable 
directly,  will do before I send v2,

thanks.

>>> @@ -405,6 +407,7 @@ interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main(unsigned long ret, struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>   
>>>   	/* Restore user access locks last */
>>>   	kuap_user_restore(regs);
>>> +	choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb() & 0xFF);
>>>   
>>>   	return ret;
>>>   }
>> So this seems to be what x86 and s390 do, but why are we choosing a
>> new offset for every interrupt when it's only used on a syscall?
>> I would rather you do what arm64 does and just choose the offset
>> at the end of system_call_exception.
>>
>> I wonder why the choose is separated from the add? I guess it's to
>> avoid a data dependency for stack access on an expensive random
>> function, so that makes sense (a comment would be nice in the
>> generic code).
> How does this read? I can send a "real" patch if it looks good:
>
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> index 1468caf001c0..ad3e80275c74 100644
> --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
> @@ -40,8 +40,11 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
>    */
>   #define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x)	((x) & 0x3FF)
>   
> -/*
> - * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and
> +/**
> + * add_random_kstack_offset - Increase stack utilization by previously
> + *			      chosen random offset
> + *
> + * This should be used in the syscall entry path when interrupts and
>    * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
>    * the stack.
>    */
> @@ -55,6 +58,24 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
>   	}								\
>   } while (0)
>   
> +/**
> + * choose_random_kstack_offset - Choose the random offsset for the next
> + *				 add_random_kstack_offset()
> + *
> + * This should only be used during syscall exit when interrupts and
> + * preempt are disabled, and before user registers have been restored
> + * from the stack. This is done to frustrate attack attempts from
> + * userspace to learn the offset:
> + * - Maximize the timing uncertainty visible from userspace: if the
> + *   the offset is chosen at syscall entry, userspace has much more
> + *   control over the timing between chosen offsets. "How long will we
> + *   be in kernel mode?" tends to be more difficult to know than "how
> + *   long will be be in user mode?"
> + * - Reduce the lifetime of the new offset sitting in memory during
> + *   kernel mode execution. Exposures of "thread-local" (e.g. current,
> + *   percpu, etc) memory contents tends to be easier than arbitrary
> + *   location memory exposures.
> + */
>   #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do {				\
>   	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,	\
>   				&randomize_kstack_offset)) {		\
>
>