linux-hardening - Re: [PATCH -next] powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization

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Date:   Mon, 16 May 2022 15:29:33 +0800
From:   xiujianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
To:     Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>,
        <benh@...nel.crashing.org>, <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
        <mark.rutland@....com>, <paulus@...ba.org>, <tglx@...utronix.de>
CC:     <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next] powerpc: add support for syscall stack
 randomization


在 2022/5/12 21:17, Michael Ellerman 写道:
> xiujianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com> writes:
>> 在 2022/5/10 17:23, Nicholas Piggin 写道:
>>> Excerpts from Xiu Jianfeng's message of May 5, 2022 9:19 pm:
>>>> Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling
>>>> syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better
>>>> performance.
> ...
>>>> @@ -405,6 +407,7 @@ interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main(unsigned long ret, struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>>
>>>>    	/* Restore user access locks last */
>>>>    	kuap_user_restore(regs);
>>>> +	choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb() & 0xFF);
>>>>
>>>>    	return ret;
>>>>    }
>>> So this seems to be what x86 and s390 do, but why are we choosing a
>>> new offset for every interrupt when it's only used on a syscall?
>>> I would rather you do what arm64 does and just choose the offset
>>> at the end of system_call_exception.
>> thanks for you suggestion, will do in v2.
>>> I wonder why the choose is separated from the add? I guess it's to
>>> avoid a data dependency for stack access on an expensive random
>>> function, so that makes sense (a comment would be nice in the
>>> generic code).
>>>
>>> I don't actually know if mftb() is cheaper here than a RNG. It
>>> may not be conditioned all that well either. I would be tempted
>> #if defined(__powerpc64__) && (defined(CONFIG_PPC_CELL) ||
>> defined(CONFIG_E500))
>> #define mftb()          ({unsigned long rval;                           \
>>                           asm volatile(                                   \
>>                                   "90:    mfspr %0, %2;\n"                \
>> ASM_FTR_IFSET(                          \
>>                                           "97:    cmpwi %0,0;\n"          \
>>                                           "       beq- 90b;\n", "", %1)   \
>>                           : "=r" (rval) \
>>                           : "i" (CPU_FTR_CELL_TB_BUG), "i" (SPRN_TBRL) :
>> "cr0"); \
>>                           rval;})
>> #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC_8xx)
>> #define mftb()          ({unsigned long rval;   \
>>                           asm volatile("mftbl %0" : "=r" (rval)); rval;})
>> #else
>> #define mftb()          ({unsigned long rval;   \
>>                           asm volatile("mfspr %0, %1" : \
>>                                        "=r" (rval) : "i" (SPRN_TBRL));
>> rval;})
>> #endif /* !CONFIG_PPC_CELL */
>>
>> there are 3 implementations of mftb() in
>> arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso/timebase.h,
>>
>> the last two cases have only one instruction, It's obviously cheaper
>> than get_random_int,
> Just because it's one instruction doesn't mean it's obviously cheaper.
> On some CPUs mftb takes 10s of cycles, and can also stall the pipeline.
>
> But looking at get_random_u32() it does look pretty complicated, it
> takes a lock and so on. It's also silly to call get_random_u32() for
> 4-bits of randomness.
>
> My initial impression was that mftb() is too predictable to be useful
> against a determined attacker. But looking closer I see that
> choose_random_kstack_offset() xor's the value we pass with the existing
> value. So that makes me less worried about using mftb().
>
> We could additionally call choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_int())
> less regularly, eg. during context switch. But I guess that's too
> infrequent to actually make any difference.
>
> But limiting it to 4-bits of randomness seems insufficient. It seems
> like we should allow the full 6 (10) bits, and anyone turning this
> option on should probably also consider increasing their stack size.
>
> Also did you check the help text about stack-protector under
> HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET?

thanks for your reminder, will disable stack-protector for interrupt.c 
in v2,

just like arm64 do.

>
> cheers