linux-hardening - [PATCH v3] powerpc/mm: Support execute-only memory on the Radix MMU

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20220809024433.17644-1-ruscur@russell.cc>
Date:   Tue,  9 Aug 2022 12:44:33 +1000
From:   Russell Currey <ruscur@...sell.cc>
To:     linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Cc:     mpe@...erman.id.au, ajd@...ux.ibm.com, aneesh.kumar@...ux.ibm.com,
        npiggin@...il.com, anshuman.khandual@....com,
        christophe.leroy@...roup.eu, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
        Russell Currey <ruscur@...sell.cc>
Subject: [PATCH v3] powerpc/mm: Support execute-only memory on the Radix MMU

The Hash MMU already supports XOM (i.e. mmap with PROT_EXEC only)
through the execute-only pkey.  A PROT_EXEC-only mapping will actually
map to RX, and then the pkey will be applied on top of it.

Radix doesn't have pkeys, but it does have execute permissions built-in
to the MMU, so all we have to do to support XOM is expose it.

Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@...sell.cc>
---
v3: Incorporate Aneesh's suggestions, leave protection_map untouched
Basic test: https://github.com/ruscur/junkcode/blob/main/mmap_test.c

 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h |  2 ++
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c           | 11 +++++++++--
 arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c                      |  6 +++++-
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
index 392ff48f77df..486902aff040 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@
 #define PAGE_COPY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
 #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ)
 #define PAGE_READONLY_X	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
+/* Radix only, Hash uses PAGE_READONLY_X + execute-only pkey instead */
+#define PAGE_EXECONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_EXEC)
 
 /* Permission masks used for kernel mappings */
 #define PAGE_KERNEL	__pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_KERNEL_RW)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c
index 7b9966402b25..62f63d344596 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/pgtable.c
@@ -553,8 +553,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memremap_compat_align);
 
 pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
-					(VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]);
+	unsigned long prot;
+
+	/* Radix supports execute-only, but protection_map maps X -> RX */
+	if (radix_enabled() && ((vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC)) == VM_EXEC)) {
+		prot = pgprot_val(PAGE_EXECONLY);
+	} else {
+		prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
+				  (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]);
+	}
 
 	if (vm_flags & VM_SAO)
 		prot |= _PAGE_SAO;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
index 014005428687..59e4cbcf3109 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
@@ -270,7 +270,11 @@ static bool access_error(bool is_write, bool is_exec, struct vm_area_struct *vma
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(!vma_is_accessible(vma)))
+	/* On Radix, a read fault could be from PROT_NONE or PROT_EXEC */
+	if (unlikely(radix_enabled() && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)))
+		return true;
+	/* Check for a PROT_NONE fault on other MMUs */
+	else if (unlikely(!vma_is_accessible(vma)))
 		return true;
 	/*
 	 * We should ideally do the vma pkey access check here. But in the
-- 
2.37.1