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Message-Id: <20220902234213.3034396-1-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 16:42:13 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
This security defense is runtime enabled via CPU ID, so build it in by
default. It will be enabled if the CPU supports it. The build takes
2 seconds longer, which seems a small price to pay for gaining this
coverage by default.
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Suggested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f9920f1341c8..b48fd28cba4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
- bool
+ def_bool y
depends on X86_64 && CC_HAS_IBT && HAVE_OBJTOOL
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
--
2.34.1
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