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Message-Id: <20220902204351.2521805-4-keescook@chromium.org> Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 13:43:51 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>, Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>, David Gow <davidgow@...gle.com>, Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Sander Vanheule <sander@...nheule.net>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Isabella Basso <isabbasso@...eup.net>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>, Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1 Clean up uses of "(size_t)-1" in favor of SIZE_MAX. Cc: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> --- include/linux/fortify-string.h | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h index 07d5d1921eff..8f2b6b1cb848 100644 --- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h +++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h @@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning(" #define __compiletime_strlen(p) \ ({ \ unsigned char *__p = (unsigned char *)(p); \ - size_t __ret = (size_t)-1; \ + size_t __ret = SIZE_MAX; \ size_t __p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1); \ - if (__p_size != (size_t)-1 && \ + if (__p_size != SIZE_MAX && \ __builtin_constant_p(*__p)) { \ size_t __p_len = __p_size - 1; \ if (__builtin_constant_p(__p[__p_len]) && \ @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q) { size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1) + if (p_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strcat(p, q); if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size) fortify_panic(__func__); @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size size_t ret; /* We can take compile-time actions when maxlen is const. */ - if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != (size_t)-1) { + if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != SIZE_MAX) { /* If p is const, we can use its compile-time-known len. */ if (maxlen >= p_size) return p_len; @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p) size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1); /* Give up if we don't know how large p is. */ - if (p_size == (size_t)-1) + if (p_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strlen(p); ret = strnlen(p, p_size); if (p_size <= ret) @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, si size_t q_len; /* Full count of source string length. */ size_t len; /* Count of characters going into destination. */ - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size); q_len = strlen(q); len = (q_len >= size) ? size - 1 : q_len; @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1); /* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */ - if (p_size == (size_t) -1 && q_size == (size_t) -1) + if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __real_strscpy(p, q, size); /* @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1); size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1); - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count); p_len = strlen(p); copy_len = strnlen(q, count); @@ -299,10 +299,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size, /* * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known. - * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer + * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer * lengths are unknown.) */ - if (p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size) + if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) fortify_panic("memset"); } @@ -393,11 +393,11 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size, /* * Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the * field, when the buffer's remaining size is known. - * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer + * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer * lengths are unknown.) */ - if ((p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size) || - (q_size != (size_t)(-1) && q_size < size)) + if ((p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) || + (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size)) fortify_panic(func); } @@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q) size_t size; /* If neither buffer size is known, immediately give up. */ - if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1) + if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX) return __underlying_strcpy(p, q); size = strlen(q) + 1; /* Compile-time check for const size overflow. */ -- 2.34.1
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