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Message-Id: <20220920192202.190793-2-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 12:21:59 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev,
Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@...plt.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] x86/entry: Work around Clang __bdos() bug
After expanding bounds checking to use __builtin_dynamic_object_size(),
Clang produces a false positive when building with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
and CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y when operating on an array with a dynamic
offset. Work around this by using a direct assignment of an empty
instance. Avoids this warning:
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:309:4: warning: call to __write_overflow_field declared with 'warn
ing' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Wat
tribute-warning]
__write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
^
which was isolated to the memset() call in xen_load_idt().
Note that this looks very much like another bug that was worked around:
https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1592
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
Cc: xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Cc: llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 0ed2e487a693..9b1a58dda935 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
{
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
static struct trap_info traps[257];
+ static const struct trap_info zero = { };
unsigned out;
trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc);
@@ -774,7 +775,7 @@ static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc)
memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc));
out = xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps, false);
- memset(&traps[out], 0, sizeof(traps[0]));
+ traps[out] = zero;
xen_mc_flush();
if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps))
--
2.34.1
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