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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 22:03:18 +0000 From: David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM> To: 'Andy Lutomirski' <luto@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Jorge Merlino <jorge.merlino@...onical.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@...utronix.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>, "linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, "John Johansen" <john.johansen@...onical.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, "Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@...hat.com>, Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@...hat.com>, Micah Morton <mortonm@...omium.org>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>, Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com" <apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com>, "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, "selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org> Subject: RE: [PATCH 1/2] fs/exec: Explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec From: Andy Lutomirski > Sent: 14 October 2022 04:18 ... > But seriously, this makes no sense at all. It should not be possible to exec a program and then, > without ptrace, change its cwd out from under it. Do we really need to preserve this behavior? it maybe ok if the exec'ed program also 'bought-in' to the fact that its cwd and open files might get changed. But imagine someone doing it to a login shell! David - Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
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