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Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 12:02:53 +0200 From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>, Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] mempool: Do not use ksize() for poisoning On 10/26/22 01:36, Kees Cook wrote: > Nothing appears to be using ksize() within the kmalloc-backed mempools > except the mempool poisoning logic. Use the actual pool size instead > of the ksize() to avoid needing any special handling of the memory as > needed by KASAN, UBSAN_BOUNDS, nor FORTIFY_SOURCE. > > Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f4fc52c4-7c18-1d76-0c7a-4058ea2486b9@suse.cz/ > Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com> > Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com> > Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com> > Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> > Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz> > --- > v3: remove ksize() calls instead of adding kmalloc_roundup_size() calls (vbabka) > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221018090323.never.897-kees@kernel.org/ > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220923202822.2667581-14-keescook@chromium.org/ > --- > mm/mempool.c | 6 +++--- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/mempool.c b/mm/mempool.c > index 96488b13a1ef..54204065037d 100644 > --- a/mm/mempool.c > +++ b/mm/mempool.c > @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static void check_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) > { > /* Mempools backed by slab allocator */ > if (pool->free == mempool_free_slab || pool->free == mempool_kfree) { > - __check_element(pool, element, ksize(element)); > + __check_element(pool, element, (size_t)pool->pool_data); > } else if (pool->free == mempool_free_pages) { > /* Mempools backed by page allocator */ > int order = (int)(long)pool->pool_data; > @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) > { > /* Mempools backed by slab allocator */ > if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc) { > - __poison_element(element, ksize(element)); > + __poison_element(element, (size_t)pool->pool_data); > } else if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages) { > /* Mempools backed by page allocator */ > int order = (int)(long)pool->pool_data; > @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) > static void kasan_unpoison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element) > { > if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc) > - kasan_unpoison_range(element, __ksize(element)); > + kasan_unpoison_range(element, (size_t)pool->pool_data); > else if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages) > kasan_unpoison_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data, > false);
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