linux-hardening - Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory

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Message-ID: <1d3a2fafcc14de7406fd689029277fd74ed3ce87.camel@sipsolutions.net>
Date:   Tue, 22 Nov 2022 17:46:09 +0100
From:   Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@...el.com>,
        Haim Dreyfuss <haim.dreyfuss@...el.com>,
        Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@...el.com>,
        Petr Stourac <pstourac@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@...el.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Nathan Errera <nathan.errera@...el.com>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        Shaul Triebitz <shaul.triebitz@...el.com>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@...el.com>,
        Abhishek Naik <abhishek.naik@...el.com>,
        Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@...hat.com>,
        Ayala Beker <ayala.beker@...el.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
        Sriram R <quic_srirrama@...cinc.com>,
        Kalle Valo <kvalo@...nel.org>,
        Mike Golant <michael.golant@...el.com>,
        Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@...el.com>,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
        linux-next@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions

On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 14:25 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 10:04:38PM +0100, Johannes Berg wrote:
> > On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 08:54 -0800, coverity-bot wrote:
> > > 
> > > *** CID 1527370:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
> > > drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
> > > 117
> > > 118     	if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
> > > 119     		return -EINVAL;
> > > 120
> > > 121     	if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
> > > 122     	    keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
> > > vvv     CID 1527370:  Memory - corruptions  (OVERRUN)
> > > vvv     Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
> > > 123     		memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
> > > 124     		       keyconf->keylen);
> > > 125     	else
> > > 126     		memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
> > > 127
> > > 128     	if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
> > > 
> > > If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
> > > such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
> > > sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
> > > include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
> > > 
> > 
> > Well, I don't think you can teach coverity this easily, but the
> > WARN_ON() check there is not really meant to protect this - WEP keys
> > must have a length of either 5 or 13 bytes (40 or 104 bits!).
> > 
> > So there's no issue here, but I'm not surprised that coverity wouldn't
> > be able to figure that out through the stack.
> 
> Gotcha. And some other layer is doing the verification that cipher and
> keylen are correctly matched?


Yes, the key must come through cfg80211_validate_key_settings() at some
point.

johannes