linux-hardening - [PATCH 4/9] fortify: Add protection for strlcat()

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Date:   Wed,  5 Apr 2023 17:02:03 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...flux.net>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@...nel.org>,
        Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@...el.com>,
        Puyou Lu <puyou.lu@...il.com>, Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Brendan Higgins <brendan.higgins@...ux.dev>,
        David Gow <davidgow@...gle.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Zhaoyang Huang <zhaoyang.huang@...soc.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@...der.be>,
        Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@...cle.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
        Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Sander Vanheule <sander@...nheule.net>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
        Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>,
        Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@...gle.com>,
        José Expósito <jose.exposito89@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kunit-dev@...glegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] fortify: Add protection for strlcat()

From: Kees Cook <kees@...flux.net>

The definition of strcat() was was defined in terms of unfortified
strlcat(), but that meant there was no bounds checking done on the
internal strlen() calls, and the (bounded) copy would be performed before
reporting a failure. Additionally, pathological cases (i.e. unterminated
destination buffer) did not make calls to fortify_panic(), which will
make future unit testing more difficult. Instead, explicitly define a
fortified strlcat() wrapper for strcat() to use.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@...flux.net>
---
 include/linux/fortify-string.h | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
index c9de1f59ee80..875689aa83c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -371,6 +371,70 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
 	return __real_strscpy(p, q, len);
 }
 
+/* Defined after fortified strlen() to reuse it. */
+extern size_t __real_strlcat(char *p, const char *q, size_t avail) __RENAME(strlcat);
+/**
+ * strlcat - Append a string to an existing string
+ *
+ * @p: pointer to %NUL-terminated string to append to
+ * @q: pointer to %NUL-terminated string to append from
+ * @avail: Maximum bytes available in @p
+ *
+ * Appends %NUL-terminated string @q after the %NUL-terminated
+ * string at @p, but will not write beyond @avail bytes total,
+ * potentially truncating the copy from @q. @p will stay
+ * %NUL-terminated only if a %NUL already existed within
+ * the @avail bytes of @p. If so, the resulting number of
+ * bytes copied from @q will be at most "@avail - strlen(@p) - 1".
+ *
+ * Do not use this function. While FORTIFY_SOURCE tries to avoid
+ * read and write overflows, this is only possible when the sizes
+ * of @p and @q are known to the compiler. Prefer building the
+ * string with formatting, via scnprintf(), seq_buf, or similar.
+ *
+ * Returns total bytes that _would_ have been contained by @p
+ * regardless of truncation, similar to snprintf(). If return
+ * value is >= @avail, the string has been truncated.
+ *
+ */
+__FORTIFY_INLINE
+size_t strlcat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, size_t avail)
+{
+	size_t p_len, copy_len;
+	size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
+	size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
+	size_t actual, wanted;
+
+	/* Give up immediately if both buffer sizes are unknown. */
+	if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
+		return __real_strlcat(p, q, avail);
+
+	p_len = strnlen(p, avail);
+	copy_len = strlen(q);
+	wanted = actual = p_len + copy_len;
+
+	/* Cannot append any more: report truncation. */
+	if (avail <= p_len)
+		return wanted;
+
+	/* Give up if string is already overflowed. */
+	if (p_size <= p_len)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+
+	if (actual >= avail) {
+		copy_len = avail - p_len - 1;
+		actual = p_len + copy_len;
+	}
+
+	/* Give up if copy will overflow. */
+	if (p_size <= actual)
+		fortify_panic(__func__);
+	__underlying_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
+	p[actual] = '\0';
+
+	return wanted;
+}
+
 /**
  * strncat - Append a string to an existing string
  *
-- 
2.34.1