linux-hardening - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 18/19] heki: x86: Protect guest kernel memory using the KVM hypervisor

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Message-ID: <e430efa3-6a7a-44c8-a1d2-9943c76f748e@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 13:47:07 -0600
From: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
 Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
 "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
 Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
 Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Thomas Gleixner
 <tglx@...utronix.de>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
 Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>, Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>,
 Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
 "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
 Forrest Yuan Yu <yuanyu@...gle.com>, James Gowans <jgowans@...zon.com>,
 James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
 John Andersen <john.s.andersen@...el.com>,
 Marian Rotariu <marian.c.rotariu@...il.com>,
 Mihai Donțu <mdontu@...defender.com>,
 Nicușor Cîțu <nicu.citu@...oud.com>,
 Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@...rosoft.com>,
 Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@...cinc.com>, Wei Liu <wei.liu@...nel.org>,
 Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
 Zahra Tarkhani <ztarkhani@...rosoft.com>,
 Ștefan Șicleru <ssicleru@...defender.com>,
 dev@...ts.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
 qemu-devel@...gnu.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
 x86@...nel.org, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 18/19] heki: x86: Protect guest kernel memory using
 the KVM hypervisor

On 11/27/23 14:03, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 11:05:23AM -0600, Madhavan T. Venkataraman wrote:
>> Apologies for the late reply. I was on vacation. Please see my response below:
>>
>> On 11/13/23 02:54, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>> On Sun, Nov 12, 2023 at 09:23:25PM -0500, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>> From: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>
>>>>
>>>> Implement a hypervisor function, kvm_protect_memory() that calls the
>>>> KVM_HC_PROTECT_MEMORY hypercall to request the KVM hypervisor to
>>>> set specified permissions on a list of guest pages.
>>>>
>>>> Using the protect_memory() function, set proper EPT permissions for all
>>>> guest pages.
>>>>
>>>> Use the MEM_ATTR_IMMUTABLE property to protect the kernel static
>>>> sections and the boot-time read-only sections. This enables to make sure
>>>> a compromised guest will not be able to change its main physical memory
>>>> page permissions. However, this also disable any feature that may change
>>>> the kernel's text section (e.g., ftrace, Kprobes), but they can still be
>>>> used on kernel modules.
>>>>
>>>> Module loading/unloading, and eBPF JIT is allowed without restrictions
>>>> for now, but we'll need a way to authenticate these code changes to
>>>> really improve the guests' security. We plan to use module signatures,
>>>> but there is no solution yet to authenticate eBPF programs.
>>>>
>>>> Being able to use ftrace and Kprobes in a secure way is a challenge not
>>>> solved yet. We're looking for ideas to make this work.
>>>>
>>>> Likewise, the JUMP_LABEL feature cannot work because the kernel's text
>>>> section is read-only.
>>>
>>> What is the actual problem? As is the kernel text map is already RO and
>>> never changed.
>>
>> For the JUMP_LABEL optimization, the text needs to be patched at some point.
>> That patching requires a writable mapping of the text page at the time of
>> patching.
>>
>> In this Heki feature, we currently lock down the kernel text at the end of
>> kernel boot just before kicking off the init process. The lockdown is
>> implemented by setting the permissions of a text page to R_X in the extended
>> page table and not allowing write permissions in the EPT after that. So, jump label
>> patching during kernel boot is not a problem. But doing it after kernel
>> boot is a problem.
> 
> But you see, that's exactly what the kernel already does with the normal
> permissions. They get set to RX after init and are never changed.
> 
> See the previous patch, we establish a read-write alias and write there.
> 
> You seem to lack basic understanding of how the kernel works in this
> regard, which makes me very nervous about you touching any of this.
> 
> I must also say I really dislike your extra/random permssion calls all
> over the place. They don't really get us anything afaict. Why can't you
> plumb into the existing set_memory_*() family?

I have responded to your comments on your other email. Please read my
response there.

Thanks.

Madhavan