linux-hardening - [RFC PATCH v3 03/11] mseal: add can_modify_mm and can_modify

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:16:57 +0000
From: jeffxu@...omium.org
To: akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	keescook@...omium.org,
	jannh@...gle.com,
	sroettger@...gle.com,
	willy@...radead.org,
	gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Cc: jeffxu@...gle.com,
	jorgelo@...omium.org,
	groeck@...omium.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org,
	pedro.falcato@...il.com,
	dave.hansen@...el.com,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
	deraadt@...nbsd.org,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 03/11] mseal: add can_modify_mm and can_modify_vma

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>

Two utilities to be used later.

can_modify_mm:
 checks sealing flags for given memory range.

can_modify_vma:
  checks sealing flags for given vma.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
---
 include/linux/mm.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 mm/mseal.c         | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 3d1120570de5..2435acc1f44f 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -3339,6 +3339,12 @@ static inline unsigned long vma_seals(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return (vma->vm_seals & MM_SEAL_ALL);
 }
 
+extern bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+		unsigned long end, unsigned long checkSeals);
+
+extern bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		unsigned long checkSeals);
+
 #else
 static inline bool check_vma_seals_mergeable(unsigned long vm_seals1)
 {
@@ -3349,6 +3355,18 @@ static inline unsigned long vma_seals(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+		unsigned long end, unsigned long checkSeals)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		unsigned long checkSeals)
+{
+	return true;
+}
 #endif
 
 /* These take the mm semaphore themselves */
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
index 13bbe9ef5883..d12aa628ebdc 100644
--- a/mm/mseal.c
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -26,6 +26,44 @@ static bool can_do_mseal(unsigned long types, unsigned long flags)
 	return true;
 }
 
+/*
+ * check if a vma is sealed for modification.
+ * return true, if modification is allowed.
+ */
+bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		    unsigned long checkSeals)
+{
+	if (checkSeals & vma_seals(vma))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the vmas of a memory range are allowed to be modified.
+ * the memory ranger can have a gap (unallocated memory).
+ * return true, if it is allowed.
+ */
+bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
+		   unsigned long checkSeals)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
+
+	if (!checkSeals)
+		return true;
+
+	/* going through each vma to check. */
+	for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
+		if (!can_modify_vma(vma, checkSeals))
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Allow by default. */
+	return true;
+}
+
 /*
  * Check if a seal type can be added to VMA.
  */
-- 
2.43.0.472.g3155946c3a-goog