linux-hardening - [PATCH 45/82] cifs: Refactor intentional wrap-around test

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20240123002814.1396804-45-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:27:20 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>,
	Paulo Alcantara <pc@...guebit.com>,
	Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@...hat.com>,
	Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@...rosoft.com>,
	Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com>,
	linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org,
	samba-technical@...ts.samba.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>,
	Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 45/82] cifs: Refactor intentional wrap-around test

In an effort to separate intentional arithmetic wrap-around from
unexpected wrap-around, we need to refactor places that depend on this
kind of math. One of the most common code patterns of this is:

	VAR + value < VAR

Notably, this is considered "undefined behavior" for signed and pointer
types, which the kernel works around by using the -fno-strict-overflow
option in the build[1] (which used to just be -fwrapv). Regardless, we
want to get the kernel source to the position where we can meaningfully
instrument arithmetic wrap-around conditions and catch them when they
are unexpected, regardless of whether they are signed[2], unsigned[3],
or pointer[4] types.

Refactor open-coded wrap-around addition test to use add_would_overflow().
This paves the way to enabling the wrap-around sanitizers in the future.

Link: https://git.kernel.org/linus/68df3755e383e6fecf2354a67b08f92f18536594 [1]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [3]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [4]
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>
Cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@...guebit.com>
Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@...hat.com>
Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@...rosoft.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@...ts.samba.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c
index 288199f0b987..85399525f0a7 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c
@@ -5007,7 +5007,7 @@ num_entries(int infotype, char *bufstart, char *end_of_buf, char **lastentry,
 	entryptr = bufstart;
 
 	while (1) {
-		if (entryptr + next_offset < entryptr ||
+		if (add_would_overflow(entryptr, next_offset) ||
 		    entryptr + next_offset > end_of_buf ||
 		    entryptr + next_offset + size > end_of_buf) {
 			cifs_dbg(VFS, "malformed search entry would overflow\n");
@@ -5023,7 +5023,7 @@ num_entries(int infotype, char *bufstart, char *end_of_buf, char **lastentry,
 			len = le32_to_cpu(dir_info->FileNameLength);
 
 		if (len < 0 ||
-		    entryptr + len < entryptr ||
+		    add_would_overflow(entryptr, len) ||
 		    entryptr + len > end_of_buf ||
 		    entryptr + len + size > end_of_buf) {
 			cifs_dbg(VFS, "directory entry name would overflow frame end of buf %p\n",
-- 
2.34.1