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Message-Id:
<170621822937.6239.4360145858676634125.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 21:30:29 +0000
From: patchwork-bot+linux-riscv@...nel.org
To: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@...ylab.org>
Cc: linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, paul.walmsley@...ive.com,
palmer@...belt.com, aou@...s.berkeley.edu, keescook@...omium.org,
guoren@...nel.org, bjorn@...osinc.com, jszhang@...nel.org,
conor.dooley@...rochip.com, andy.chiu@...ive.com, samitolvanen@...gle.com,
coelacanthushex@...il.com, dlemoal@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, palmer@...osinc.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] riscv: Support RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
Hello:
This patch was applied to riscv/linux.git (for-next)
by Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...osinc.com>:
On Thu, 9 Nov 2023 21:37:51 +0800 you wrote:
> Inspired from arm64's implement -- commit 70918779aec9
> ("arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support")
>
> Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
> the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() (i.e. 10 bits).
>
> In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
> slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
> disable stack protector for do_trap_ecall_u() at the function level.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [V2] riscv: Support RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/05d450aabd73
You are awesome, thank you!
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