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Message-ID: <202404301409.D3BC98D5@keescook>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 14:15:53 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hardening: Refresh KCFI options, add some more
On Tue, Apr 30, 2024 at 10:48:36AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 30, 2024 at 11:21:40AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 03:29:44PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > > - CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y for x86 and arm64. (And disable FINEIBT since
> > > it isn't as secure as straight KCFI.)
> >
> > Oi ?
>
> Same objection I always had[1]: moving the check into the destination
> means attacks with control over executable memory contents can just omit
> the check.
>
> But now that I went to go look I see 0c3e806ec0f9 ("x86/cfi: Add boot
> time hash randomization") is only enabled under FINEIBT... seems better
> if that were always enabled...
And FINEIBT actually can't be disabled... :|
And as it turns out CFI_CLANG doesn't work at all on v6.9...
[ 0.587220] no CFI hash found at: __call_sites+0x339a8/0x34450 ffffffffac20cef8 00 00 00 00 00
[ 0.588226] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1182 __apply_fineibt+0x7a9/0x820
...
[ 0.619220] SMP alternatives: Something went horribly wrong trying to rewrite the CFI implementation.
*hang*
--
Kees Cook
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