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Message-ID: <CABi2SkUU1ChZ6JJ_5aDCL2fQpNts3L3j69iK70UTt0ZJP3_FWw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 09:43:10 -0800
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: Benjamin Berg <benjamin@...solutions.net>
Cc: akpm@...ux-foundation.org, keescook@...omium.org, jannh@...gle.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org, oleg@...hat.com,
linux-um@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, jorgelo@...omium.org,
sroettger@...gle.com, ojeda@...nel.org, adobriyan@...il.com,
anna-maria@...utronix.de, mark.rutland@....com, linus.walleij@...aro.org,
Jason@...c4.com, deller@....de, rdunlap@...radead.org, davem@...emloft.net,
hch@....de, peterx@...hat.com, hca@...ux.ibm.com, f.fainelli@...il.com,
gerg@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, mingo@...nel.org,
ardb@...nel.org, Liam.Howlett@...cle.com, mhocko@...e.com,
42.hyeyoo@...il.com, peterz@...radead.org, ardb@...gle.com, enh@...gle.com,
rientjes@...gle.com, groeck@...omium.org, mpe@...erman.id.au
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] exec: seal system mappings
On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 6:04 AM Benjamin Berg <benjamin@...solutions.net> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On Mon, 2024-11-25 at 20:20 +0000, jeffxu@...omium.org wrote:
> > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> >
> > Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
> >
> > Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect
> > them from ever changing or unmapped during the life time of the process.
> > For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see mseal.rst [1].
> >
> > System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are
> > generated by the kernel during program initialization, and are
> > sealed after creation.
> >
> > Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not
> > established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same
> > as the process's lifetime [2]. It is sealed from creation.
> >
> > The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
> > _install_special_mapping() function. As no other mappings utilize this
> > function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within
> > _install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of
> > modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.
> >
> > The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is
> > sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure
> > case of using vsyscall.
> >
> > It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may
> > alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore
> > operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled
> > across all systems.
>
> I think that enabling this feature would break User Mode Linux (UML).
> It uses a tiny static helper executable to create userspace MMs. This
> executable just maps some "stub" data/code pages[1] for management and
> after that all other memory has to be unmapped as it is managed by the
> UML kernel.
> This unmapping will not work if the vdso/vvar mappings are sealed.
>
> Maybe nobody who enables the feature cares about UML. But wanted to
> raise it as a potential issue in case you are not aware yet.
>
Thank you for bringing this to attention, I will add this information
to documentation/comments.
Do you think we need to add a KCONFIG check similar to
!CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ? or this is something purely in userspace and
the kernel doesn't have a control.
> Benjamin
>
> [1] Hmm, we should mseal() those stub pages.
>
is this reference [1] correct ?
> >
> > Currently, memory sealing is only functional in a 64-bit kernel
> > configuration.
> >
> > To enable this feature, the architecture needs to be tested to
> > confirm that it doesn't unmap/remap system mappings during the
> > the life time of the process. After the architecture enables
> > ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS, a distribution can set
> > CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPING to manage access to the feature.
> > Alternatively, kernel command line (exec.seal_system_mappings)
> > enables this feature also.
> >
> > This feature is tested using ChromeOS and Android on X86_64 and ARM64,
> > therefore ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS is set for X86_64 and ARM64.
> > Other architectures can enable this after testing. No specific hardware
> > features from the CPU are needed.
> >
> > This feature's security enhancements will benefit ChromeOS, Android,
> > and other secure-by-default systems.
> >
> > [1] Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> > ---
> > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++++++
> > Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 4 ++
> > arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
> > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
> > arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 8 +++-
> > include/linux/mm.h | 12 ++++++
> > init/Kconfig | 25 ++++++++++++
> > mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++
> > mm/mseal.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
> > security/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++
> > 10 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index e7bfe1bde49e..f63268341739 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -1538,6 +1538,17 @@
> > Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of
> > current integrity status.
> >
> > + exec.seal_system_mappings = [KNL]
> > + Format: { no | yes }
> > + Seal system mappings: vdso, vvar, sigpage, vsyscall,
> > + uprobe.
> > + - 'no': do not seal system mappings.
> > + - 'yes': seal system mappings.
> > + This overrides CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS=(y/n)
> > + If not specified or invalid, default is the value set by
> > + CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS.
> > + This option has no effect if CONFIG_64BIT=n
> > +
> > early_page_ext [KNL,EARLY] Enforces page_ext initialization to earlier
> > stages so cover more early boot allocations.
> > Please note that as side effect some optimizations
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > index 41102f74c5e2..bec122318a59 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > @@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ Use cases
> >
> > - Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
> >
> > +- seal system mappings:
> > + kernel config CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS seals system mappings such
> > + as vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
> > +
> > When not to use mseal
> > =====================
> > Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > index 63de71544d95..fc5da8f74342 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> > @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ config ARM64
> > select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS
> > select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
> > select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
> > + select ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > select ARCH_STACKWALK
> > select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
> > select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > index 1ea18662942c..5f6bac99974c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64
> > depends on 64BIT
> > # Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only:
> > select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
> > + select ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
> > select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK
> > select ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGE_PFNMAP if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > index 2fb7d53cf333..30e0958915ca 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > @@ -366,8 +366,12 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
> > set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
> > }
> >
> > - if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY)
> > - vm_flags_init(&gate_vma, VM_EXEC);
> > + if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY) {
> > + unsigned long vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
> > +
> > + vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();
> > + vm_flags_init(&gate_vma, vm_flags);
> > + }
> >
> > BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) !=
> > (unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index df0a5eac66b7..f787d6c85cbb 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -4238,4 +4238,16 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *st
> > int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> > int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> > +/*
> > + * return VM_SEALED if seal system mapping is enabled.
> > + */
> > +unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void);
> > +#else
> > +static inline unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
> > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> > index 1aa95a5dfff8..614719259aa0 100644
> > --- a/init/Kconfig
> > +++ b/init/Kconfig
> > @@ -1860,6 +1860,31 @@ config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
> > config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
> > bool
> >
> > +config ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + bool
> > + help
> > + Control SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS access based on architecture.
> > +
> > + A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > + No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > + To enable this feature, the architecture needs to be tested to
> > + confirm that it doesn't unmap/remap system mappings during the
> > + the life time of the process. After the architecture enables this,
> > + a distribution can set CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPING to manage access
> > + to the feature.
> > +
> > + The CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS already checks the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > + feature, which is known to remap/unmap vdso. Thus, the presence of
> > + CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is not considered a factor in enabling
> > + ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS for a architecture.
> > +
> > + For complete list of system mappings, please see
> > + CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS.
> > +
> > + For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > + Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> > config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
> > bool
> > help
> > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> > index 57fd5ab2abe7..bc694c555805 100644
> > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > @@ -2133,6 +2133,16 @@ struct vm_area_struct *_install_special_mapping(
> > unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> > unsigned long vm_flags, const struct vm_special_mapping *spec)
> > {
> > + /*
> > + * At present, all mappings (vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe) that
> > + * invoke the _install_special_mapping function can be sealed.
> > + * Therefore, it is logical to call the seal_system_mappings_enabled()
> > + * function here. In the future, if this is not the case, i.e. if certain
> > + * mappings cannot be sealed, then it would be necessary to move this
> > + * check to the calling function.
> > + */
> > + vm_flags |= seal_system_mappings();
> > +
> > return __install_special_mapping(mm, addr, len, vm_flags, (void *)spec,
> > &special_mapping_vmops);
> > }
> > diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
> > index ece977bd21e1..80126d6231bb 100644
> > --- a/mm/mseal.c
> > +++ b/mm/mseal.c
> > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> > * Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> > */
> >
> > +#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
> > #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
> > #include <linux/mman.h>
> > #include <linux/mm.h>
> > @@ -266,3 +267,41 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
> > {
> > return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
> > }
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Kernel cmdline override for CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + */
> > +enum seal_system_mappings_type {
> > + SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED,
> > + SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED
> > +};
> > +
> > +static enum seal_system_mappings_type seal_system_mappings_v __ro_after_init =
> > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS) ? SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED :
> > + SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED;
> > +
> > +static const struct constant_table value_table_sys_mapping[] __initconst = {
> > + { "no", SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_DISABLED},
> > + { "yes", SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED},
> > + { }
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int __init early_seal_system_mappings_override(char *buf)
> > +{
> > + if (!buf)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + seal_system_mappings_v = lookup_constant(value_table_sys_mapping,
> > + buf, seal_system_mappings_v);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +early_param("exec.seal_system_mappings", early_seal_system_mappings_override);
> > +
> > +unsigned long seal_system_mappings(void)
> > +{
> > + if (seal_system_mappings_v == SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ENABLED)
> > + return VM_SEALED;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index 28e685f53bd1..5bbb8d989d79 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -51,6 +51,30 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
> >
> > endchoice
> >
> > +config SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + bool "seal system mappings"
> > + default n
> > + depends on 64BIT
> > + depends on ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > + help
> > + Seal system mappings such as vdso, vvar, sigpage, vsyscall, uprobes.
> > +
> > + A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > + No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > + Depends on the ARCH_HAS_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS.
> > +
> > + CHECKPOINT_RESTORE might relocate vdso mapping during restore,
> > + and remap/unmap will fail when the mapping is sealed, therefore
> > + !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is added as dependency.
> > +
> > + Kernel command line exec.seal_system_mappings=(no/yes) overrides
> > + this.
> > +
> > + For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > + Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> > config SECURITY
> > bool "Enable different security models"
> > depends on SYSFS
>
>
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