linux-hardening - [PATCH 3/4] mm: security: Check early if HARDENED

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Message-ID: <20250122171925.25472-4-mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 17:19:24 +0000
From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>
To: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] mm: security: Check early if HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled

HARDENED_USERCOPY is checked within a function so even if disabled, the
function overhead still exists. Move the static check inline.

This is at best a micro-optimisation and any difference in performance
was within noise but it is relatively consistent with the init_on_*
implementations.

Suggested-by: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>
---
 include/linux/thread_info.h |  8 ++++++++
 mm/usercopy.c               | 11 ++++++-----
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/thread_info.h b/include/linux/thread_info.h
index cf2446c9c30d..832f6a97e64c 100644
--- a/include/linux/thread_info.h
+++ b/include/linux/thread_info.h
@@ -221,9 +221,17 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
 extern void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 					bool to_user);
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON,
+			   validate_usercopy_range);
+
 static __always_inline void check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 					      bool to_user)
 {
+	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON,
+				&validate_usercopy_range)) {
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
 		__check_object_size(ptr, n, to_user);
 }
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 4cf33305347a..2e86413ed244 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -201,7 +201,9 @@ static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 	}
 }
 
-static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_DEFAULT_ON,
+			   validate_usercopy_range);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(validate_usercopy_range);
 
 /*
  * Validates that the given object is:
@@ -212,9 +214,6 @@ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks);
  */
 void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
 {
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
-		return;
-
 	/* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
 	if (!n)
 		return;
@@ -271,7 +270,9 @@ __setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy);
 static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void)
 {
 	if (enable_checks == false)
-		static_branch_enable(&bypass_usercopy_checks);
+		static_branch_enable(&validate_usercopy_range);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&validate_usercopy_range);
 	return 1;
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0