| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <1152902503.23584.21.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2006 11:41:43 -0700
From: Kylene Jo Hall <kjhall@...ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Safford <safford@...ibm.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@...ibm.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 5/6] SLIM: make and config stuff
Sorry accidently sent to LSM twice instead of LSM and LKML.
This patch contains the Makefile, Kconfig and .h files for SLIM.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kylene Hall <kjhall@...ibm.com>
---
security/Kconfig | 1
security/Makefile | 1
security/slim/Kconfig | 6 ++
security/slim/Makefile | 6 ++
security/slim/slim.h | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 116 insertions(+)
--- linux-2.6.17/security/slim/Makefile 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/slim/Makefile 2006-07-06 14:24:00.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the SLIM module as part of the kernel tree.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SLIM) += slim.o
+slim-y := slm_main.o slm_secfs.o
--- linux-2.6.17/security/slim/Kconfig 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/slim/Kconfig 2006-07-05 09:23:11.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+config SECURITY_SLIM
+ tristate "SLIM support"
+ depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_NETWORK
+ help
+ The Simple Linux Integrity Module implements a modified low water-mark
+ mandatory access control integrity model.
--- linux-2.6.17/security/Makefile 2006-04-26 19:19:25.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/Makefile 2006-07-05 11:51:35.000000000 -0700
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SLIM) += slim/
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
# if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
--- linux-2.6.17/security/Kconfig 2006-04-26 19:19:25.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/Kconfig 2006-07-05 09:23:11.000000000 -0700
@@ -101,5 +101,6 @@ config SECURITY_SECLVL
source security/selinux/Kconfig
+source security/slim/Kconfig
endmenu
--- linux-2.6.17/security/slim/slim.h 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.17/security/slim/slim.h 2006-07-13 16:23:05.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/*
+ * slim.h - simple linux integrity module
+ *
+ * SLIM's specific model is:
+ *
+ * All objects are labeled with exteded attributes to indicate:
+ * Integrity Access Class (IAC)
+ * Secrecy Access Class (SAC)
+ *
+ * All processes inherit from their parents:
+ * Integrity Read Access Class (IRAC)
+ * Integrity Write/Execute Access Class (IWXAC)
+ * Secrecy Write Access Class (SWAC)
+ * Secrecy Read/Execute Access Class (SRXAC)
+ *
+ * SLIM enforces the following Mandatory Access Control Rules:
+ * Read:
+ * IRAC(process) <= IAC(object)
+ * SRXAC(process) >= SAC(object)
+ * Write:
+ * IWXAC(process) >= IAC(object)
+ * SWAC(process) <= SAC(process)
+ * Execute:
+ * IWXAC(process) <= IAC(object)
+ * SRXAC(process) >= SAC(object)
+*/
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/version.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
+
+struct xattr_data {
+ char *name;
+ void *value;
+ size_t len;
+};
+
+ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer,
+ size_t size);
+ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size);
+int generic_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
+ size_t size, int flags);
+enum slm_iac_level { /* integrity access class */
+ SLM_IAC_ERROR = -2,
+ SLM_IAC_EXEMPT = -1,
+ SLM_IAC_NOTDEFINED = 0,
+ SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED,
+ SLM_IAC_USER,
+ SLM_IAC_SYSTEM,
+ SLM_IAC_HIGHEST
+};
+extern char *slm_iac_str[];
+
+enum slm_sac_level { /* secrecy access class */
+ SLM_SAC_ERROR = -2,
+ SLM_SAC_EXEMPT = -1,
+ SLM_SAC_NOTDEFINED = 0,
+ SLM_SAC_PUBLIC,
+ SLM_SAC_USER,
+ SLM_SAC_USER_SENSITIVE,
+ SLM_SAC_SYSTEM_SENSITIVE,
+ SLM_SAC_HIGHEST
+};
+
+struct slm_tsec_data { /* task security data (process info) */
+ enum slm_iac_level iac_r; /* read low integrity files */
+ enum slm_iac_level iac_wx; /* ability to write/execute higher */
+ enum slm_sac_level sac_w; /* ability to write low secrecy files */
+ enum slm_sac_level sac_rx; /* read/execute high secrecy files */
+ int unlimited; /* unlimited guard process */
+ struct dentry *script_dentry; /* used when filename != interp */
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+struct slm_file_xattr { /* file extended attributes */
+ enum slm_iac_level iac_level; /* integrity */
+ enum slm_sac_level sac_level; /* secrecy */
+ struct slm_tsec_data guard; /* guard process information */
+};
+
+#define SLM_LSM_ID 0x999
+extern int slm_idx;
+
+struct slm_isec_data {
+ struct slm_file_xattr level;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+static inline int is_kernel_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ return (!tsk->mm) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+extern struct slm_xattr_config *slm_parse_config(char *data,
+ unsigned long datalen,
+ int *datasize);
+
+extern int slm_init_config(void);
+
+extern __init int slm_init_secfs(void);
+extern __exit void slm_cleanup_secfs(void);
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists