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Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2006 10:16:14 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>
To: kjhall@...ibm.com
Cc: David Safford <safford@...ibm.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Serge E Hallyn <sergeh@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 6/6] SLIM: debug output
Kylie,
This patch doesn't apply properly. It seems that most of the debugging was
added in the base slim. The parts
that weren't added are listed below.
Mimi
Index: linux-2.6.17.7/security/slim/slm_main.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.17.7.orig/security/slim/slm_main.c
+++ linux-2.6.17.7/security/slim/slm_main.c
@@ -1563,6 +1563,7 @@ static void enforce_guard_integrity_exec
{
struct slm_tsec_data *cur_tsec = current->security;
struct task_struct *parent_tsk = current->parent;
+ struct slm_tsec_data *parent_tsec = parent_tsk->security;
if ((strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) != 0)
&& (level->guard.unlimited)) {
@@ -1588,6 +1589,35 @@ static void enforce_guard_integrity_exec
cur_tsec->iac_wx = level->guard.iac_wx;
spin_unlock(&cur_tsec->lock);
} else {
+ if (!parent_tsec) {
+ dprintk(SLM_SECRECY,
+ "%s: pid %d(%s %d-%s) %s "
+ " executing, promoting secrecy to sac=%d-%s\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, current->pid,
+ current->comm, cur_tsec->sac_rx,
+ (cur_tsec->sac_w != cur_tsec->sac_rx)
+ ? "GUARD" : slm_sac_str[cur_tsec->
+ sac_rx],
+ bprm->filename, level->sac_level,
+ slm_sac_str[level->sac_level]);
+ } else
+ dprintk(SLM_SECRECY,
+ "%s: ppid %d(%s %d-%s) pid %d(%s %d-%s) %s"
+ "executing, promoting secrecy to sac=%d-%s\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, parent_tsk->pid,
+ parent_tsk->comm,
+ parent_tsec->sac_rx,
+ (parent_tsec->sac_w != parent_tsec->sac_rx)
+ ? "GUARD" :
+ slm_sac_str[parent_tsec->sac_rx],
+ current->pid, current->comm,
+ cur_tsec->sac_rx,
+ (cur_tsec->sac_w != cur_tsec->sac_rx)
+ ? "GUARD" : slm_sac_str[cur_tsec->
+ sac_rx],
+ bprm->filename, level->sac_level,
+ slm_sac_str[level->sac_level]);
+
spin_lock(&cur_tsec->lock);
if (cur_tsec->iac_r > level->guard.iac_r)
cur_tsec->iac_r = level->guard.iac_r;
Index: linux-2.6.17.7/security/slim/slim.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.17.7.orig/security/slim/slim.h
+++ linux-2.6.17.7/security/slim/slim.h
@@ -100,3 +100,19 @@ extern int slm_init_config(void);
extern __init int slm_init_secfs(void);
extern __exit void slm_cleanup_secfs(void);
+
+extern __init int slm_init_debugfs(void);
+extern __exit void slm_cleanup_debugfs(void);
+
+extern unsigned int slm_debug;
+enum slm_debug_level {
+ SLM_BASE = 1,
+ SLM_INTEGRITY = 2,
+ SLM_SECRECY = 4,
+ SLM_VERBOSE = 8,
+};
+
+#undef dprintk
+#define dprintk(level, format, a...) \
+ if (slm_debug & level) \
+ printk(KERN_INFO format, ##a)
Index: linux-2.6.17.7/security/slim/slm_secfs.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.17.7.orig/security/slim/slm_secfs.c
+++ linux-2.6.17.7/security/slim/slm_secfs.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
#include "slim.h"
static struct dentry *slim_sec_dir, *slim_level;
+static struct dentry *slim_debug_dir, *slim_integrity, *slim_secrecy,
+ *slim_verbose;
static ssize_t slm_read_level(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t buflen, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -42,10 +44,85 @@ static ssize_t slm_read_level(struct fil
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, buflen, ppos, data, len);
}
+static int slm_open_debug(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ if (inode->u.generic_ip)
+ file->private_data = inode->u.generic_ip;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t slm_read_debug(struct file *file, char __user * buf,
+ size_t buflen, loff_t * ppos)
+{
+ ssize_t len = 0;
+ enum slm_debug_level type = (enum slm_debug_level)file->private_data;
+ char *page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ switch(type) {
+ case SLM_INTEGRITY:
+ len = sprintf(page, "slm_debug: integrity %s\n",
+ ((slm_debug & SLM_INTEGRITY) == SLM_INTEGRITY)
+ ? "ON" : "OFF");
+ break;
+ case SLM_SECRECY:
+ len = sprintf(page, "slm_debug: secrecy %s\n",
+ ((slm_debug & SLM_SECRECY) == SLM_SECRECY)
+ ? "ON" : "OFF");
+ break;
+ case SLM_VERBOSE:
+ len = sprintf(page, "evm_debug: verbose %s\n",
+ ((slm_debug & SLM_VERBOSE) == SLM_VERBOSE)
+ ? "ON" : "OFF");
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ len = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, buflen, ppos, page, len);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return len;
+}
+
+static ssize_t slm_write_debug(struct file *file, const char __user * buf,
+ size_t buflen, loff_t * ppos)
+{
+ char flag;
+ enum slm_debug_level type = (enum slm_debug_level)file->private_data;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&flag, buf, 1))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ switch(type) {
+ case SLM_INTEGRITY:
+ slm_debug = (flag == '0') ? slm_debug & ~SLM_INTEGRITY :
+ slm_debug | SLM_INTEGRITY;
+ break;
+ case SLM_SECRECY:
+ slm_debug = (flag == '0') ? slm_debug & ~SLM_SECRECY :
+ slm_debug | SLM_SECRECY;
+ break;
+ case SLM_VERBOSE:
+ slm_debug = (flag == '0') ? slm_debug & ~SLM_VERBOSE :
+ slm_debug | SLM_VERBOSE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return buflen;
+}
+
static struct file_operations slm_level_ops = {
.read = slm_read_level,
};
+static struct file_operations slm_debug_ops = {
+ .read = slm_read_debug,
+ .write = slm_write_debug,
+ .open = slm_open_debug,
+};
+
int __init slm_init_secfs(void)
{
slim_sec_dir = securityfs_create_dir("slim", NULL);
@@ -60,8 +137,48 @@ int __init slm_init_secfs(void)
return 0;
}
+int __init slm_init_debugfs(void)
+{
+ slim_debug_dir = debugfs_create_dir("slim", NULL);
+ if (!slim_debug_dir || IS_ERR(slim_debug_dir))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ slim_integrity = debugfs_create_file("integrity", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ slim_debug_dir, (void *)SLM_INTEGRITY,
+ &slm_debug_ops);
+ if (!slim_integrity || IS_ERR(slim_integrity))
+ goto out_del_debugdir;
+ slim_secrecy = debugfs_create_file("secrecy", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ slim_debug_dir, (void *)SLM_SECRECY,
+ &slm_debug_ops);
+ if (!slim_secrecy || IS_ERR(slim_secrecy))
+ goto out_del_integrity;
+ slim_verbose = debugfs_create_file("verbose", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ slim_debug_dir, (void *)SLM_VERBOSE,
+ &slm_debug_ops);
+ if (!slim_verbose || IS_ERR(slim_verbose))
+ goto out_del_secrecy;
+ return 0;
+
+out_del_secrecy:
+ debugfs_remove(slim_secrecy);
+out_del_integrity:
+ debugfs_remove(slim_integrity);
+out_del_debugdir:
+ debugfs_remove(slim_debug_dir);
+ return -EFAULT;
+}
+
void __exit slm_cleanup_secfs(void)
{
securityfs_remove(slim_level);
securityfs_remove(slim_sec_dir);
}
+
+void __exit slm_cleanup_debugfs(void)
+{
+ debugfs_remove(slim_verbose);
+ debugfs_remove(slim_secrecy);
+ debugfs_remove(slim_integrity);
+ debugfs_remove(slim_debug_dir);
+}
Mimi
-
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